

On the New Stage

The New Stage in the Development of the National War of Resistance Against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front

(Report to the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, from October 12 to October 14, 1938)

Comrades, I am giving a report to the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. What do I intend to say? What I am going to say will be divided into the following parts: (1) from the Fifth Plenum to the Sixth Plenum; (2) a summary of the fifteen-month War of Resistance; (3) the new stage in the development of the National War of Resistance against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front; (4) the urgent tasks of our whole nation at present; (5) long-term war and long-term cooperation; (6) China's war against aggression and the world antifascist movement; (7) the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war; and (8) the Seventh National Congress of the Party. These are the problems I want to address.

Comrades, at our Enlarged Sixth Plenum, which is being held in critical circumstances of constant artillery fire throughout the country, and a threatening war in the whole world, what work do we want to accomplish? What is our purpose? We must definitely unite forever with all patriotic parties and all patriotic countrymen of all China, overcome new difficulties, and mobilize new forces. At present, we must stop the enemy's attacks. In the future, we must carry out our counterattacks, in order to reach the goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a republic of the Three People's Principles. We must absolutely be free; we must absolutely be victorious—such is our aim, and such is also the overall orientation of my report.

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I. From the Fifth Plenum to the Sixth Plenum

1. The Convening of the Enlarged Sixth Plenum

It has been almost five years since the last plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, the Fifth Plenum convened in January 1934 in Jiangxi. Because the various members of the Central Committee were working in all sorts of different environments, inside China and abroad, we could not get together in one place. This time, except for a few comrades, the great majority of the members of the Central Committee are present; moreover, many comrades who play leading roles in various places throughout the country are also present, so that this plenum of ours has the largest number of participants of any meeting since the Sixth National Congress. Originally, we were preparing to hold the Seventh National Congress this year, but because of war and the resulting tension it has had to be postponed until next year. The current situation has, however, raised a lot of problems, for which we must find clear solutions, in order to strive for victory in the War of Resistance. Consequently, we have called this Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Committee.

2. From the Fifth Plenum to the Sixth Plenum

During the past five years, our Party has experienced many significant events. The biggest and most important are the transition from a situation of opposition between the various parties, factions, and classes inside the country to an Anti-Japanese National United Front, and the transition from civil war to the War of Resistance against Japan.

The reason civil war took shape in the past lies in the unfortunate split in the united front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party that took place in 1927, which was caused by the historical circumstances at that time.

How did the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front come about? It resulted from new historical circumstances. All of us have already clearly understood that, since the September Eighteenth Incident, the enemy of the Chinese nation, Japanese imperialism, has completed the first step of invading the Four Eastern Provinces and has proceeded to prepare and carry out the second step of invading all of China. This unprecedented historical incident has brought about a change both in the internal and in the international situation. First, it has changed and is still changing the domestic relationships among all the strata, all the parties, and all the groups; at the same time, it has changed and is still changing international relationships. As a result, our Party, on the basis of these unprecedented historical developments and of the changed domestic and international relationships, and following the path first adopted long ago in 1933 (on three conditions, to conclude agreements on waging a war of resistance against Japan with any elements of the Guomindang prepared to cooperate with us), raised this path to the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Hence we have published

our declaration of August 1935, the December Resolution, the letter of August 1936 to the Guomindang, and the Resolution of September on a Democratic Republic. Moreover, on this basis, we were further able to insist on the principle of a peaceful solution to the Xi'an Incident, which took place in December of the same year, and to deliver in February 1937 a concrete proposal for united resistance to the Third Plenum of the Guomindang. Last May, a provisional congress was convened (entitled Congress of Delegates from the Soviet Areas, participants were representatives of the soviet and non-soviet areas and representatives of the Red Army), which passed the "Tasks of the Anti-Japanese National United Front During the Current Stage" and approved the redesignation of the Red Army as the National Revolutionary Army, and the transformation of the soviets into a democratic system. In this way, a change was effectively made from the state of civil war to a new period of beginning to establish the Anti-Japanese National United Front. At that time, the Chinese Guomindang also gradually altered its policy, moving gradually to a position of united resistance to Japan. If there had been no change in the Guomindang's policy, it would have been impossible to establish the Anti-Japanese National United Front. At that time, national salvation groups had been organized in many places, and other parties and factions had also put forward demands to resist Japan. Because of the change in the policies of both the Guomindang and the Communist Party, because of the leadership of Mr. Chiang Kaishek, because of the support of the military and the people of the whole country, and because of the coordination of other groups and parties, the steps of Japanese imperialism to invade and destroy China encountered unprecedented resistance from the entire nation. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7 of last year, the whole of China, under the united leadership of the national leader and supreme commander, Chairman Chiang Kaishek, launched the sacred and righteous sound of cannons. All of China formed an unprecedented great anti-Japanese union, and an Anti-Japanese National United Front. In the second month after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, that is, in August of last year, our Party issued a Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation. In the meantime, the Eighth Route Army had completed its redesignation and had marched to North China to fight. On September 22, our Party published an open proclamation about going to save our country from national calamity on the basis of the Three People's Principles and the Guomindang's "being united in good faith." On the next day, the supreme leader of the Guomindang, the national government, and the National Revolutionary Army, Mr. Chiang Kaishek, gave a talk in which he recognized the legal existence of the Communist Party, and expressed his willingness to unite with it to save the country. Thereafter, the Anti-Japanese National United Front was fully established, with the Guomindang and the Communist Party as its foundation. In December, in order to consolidate and develop the Anti-Japanese National United Front, our Party further published a manifesto stating that we were willing not only to cooperate with the Guomintang to resist Japan but also to cooperate in

building the state. Soon after that, the Red Army guerrilla forces in the south were redesignated as the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, and marched to the south of the lower reaches of the Yangzi to fight. From this time forward, unity in resisting Japan has been progressing daily.

Comrades, this kind of change from the ten-year war between the two parties to the renewed cooperation of the two parties, and, moreover, a change that was executed under extremely difficult conditions, thereby laying the ground for the long-term cooperation between the two parties, has been completed only after passing through many difficulties and setbacks. But thanks to the efforts of the Central Committee and of the whole Party, they have been completed at last. The Communist International completely approves of this new political line of our Party (the resolution of the Communist International, *Xinhua ribao*, September 8). Moreover, for the sake of the victory of the Chinese nation, it has called on the Communist Parties and on the proletariat of all the countries in the world to support China's War of Resistance.

Comrades, if there had been no launching, establishment, and consolidation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front on the foundation of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, it would be impossible to launch such a great revolutionary War of Resistance against Japan, to sustain it, and to strive for victory. Now the people of all China and of the whole world have all understood that the Chinese nation has stood up! After being trodden upon, humiliated, invaded, and oppressed for the past hundred years, and especially after being in such an intolerable position of slavery since the September Eighteenth Incident, things have indeed changed. The people of all China, holding weapons in their hands, have marched to the battleground of the war of self-defense. The final victory of all China, namely, the dawn of freedom and emancipation for the Chinese nation, is already in sight.

We know that this current great national war of ours differs from all wars in the past history of China, because this war is a war that frees the Chinese nation from the status of semicolon and from the destruction of the state and the extinction of the race. Moreover, this war is taking place during the most progressive period in the history of the Chinese nation; at the same time, it is taking place in a period when Japanese imperialism is seeking a deadly road and heading for collapse, and also when progressive humanity throughout the world is preparing unprecedentedly broad and deep fighting forces to resist and defeat the despots, the German, Japanese, and Italian fascists, and to strive for a bright future of the world. The combination of these three factors—the combination of the three factors that have China's progress and continued progress as a basis—will guarantee that our War of Resistance will, without a doubt, ultimately be victorious, and that a free and liberated New China will definitely appear in East Asia and become an extremely important component part of the future bright world. Such a China will not only bring happiness to the 450 million Chinese but will also bring happiness to all humanity.

3. *The Tasks of the Sixth Plenum*

This Enlarged Sixth Plenum is meeting at a important juncture of the War of Resistance, which is entering a new phase in its development; the Enlarged Sixth Plenum has assumed a significant historical task.

It is entirely correct that, after more than a year of courageous fighting in the anti-Japanese war, the entire country has achieved great unity and great progress, and has struck heavy blows at Japanese imperialism. Even though much territory was lost, at the same time there were also many victories. This is an undeniable fact. As the war develops, primarily due to China's continuous progress, at the same time coupled with Japan's increased difficulties, and international support for us, the final victory will definitely belong to us, not to the enemy. This, too, can be predicted. Whoever fails to see the great achievements in the past and the victorious future will fall into the pit of pessimism and will be unable to extricate himself. But it is not enough to see only this side; the War of Resistance has another side, its negative side, which is the source of many of the difficulties before us. The conditions at present tell us that all of China's struggles, unity, progress, and victories for the past year have not been able to check the enemy's advance and do not have the force to counterattack the enemy. Wuhan is at present under threat from the enemy; the enemy will also attack Guangzhou, Changsha, the Northeast, and so on. Therefore, the people of our entire country are expecting the Communist Party to express its opinions. The new environment has posed a great many problems. Comrades, we must express our opinions and must solve the problems. Yes, our Party long ago expressed its opinions; and many fundamental problems have already been solved. But the new environment requires that we express new opinions and solve new problems.

What are the new problems?

How to add new forces on the present basis, to tide over the difficulties, to stop the enemy's attacks, and to prepare our counterattacks to reach the goal of driving the enemy out are the keys to current problems. These problems are being discussed and worried about by countless people in the whole country. Should we answer these questions? Beyond a doubt, we must.

These questions have arisen with reference to various aspects and generated many questions.

For example, what exactly has the fifteen months' experience of the War of Resistance proved? Has this experience of fifteen months proved that the War of Resistance is long-term or short-term? Is the strategic orientation to defeat the enemy in a protracted war or to defeat him quickly? Will the final victory be China's or the enemy's? Does the War of Resistance offer a way out, or is compromise the way out? If the war is protracted, then what method should be used to sustain the protracted war and achieve final victory? Does the experience of the last fifteen months provide a basis for clear answers to all these questions? Furthermore, can the basis of this past experience play a positive role in the new stage of the War of

Resistance, allowing us to overcome new difficulties and achieve new victories? These are all important questions and belong to the same set of questions.

To take another example, how will the whole War of Resistance develop and change? What is actually the nature of the so-called New Stage? If we assume that Wuhan cannot be held, just what will the trend of the war be? What should be the direction of the future effort of the whole country, that is, the urgent task of the Chinese nation at the present time? What are the good methods that will enable us to tide over the difficult moments in the war? These are even more important problems, and they are problems of another kind.

To take another example, what will the future and the long-term prospects of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party be like? What basis does the Communist Party have for talking about long-term cooperation? What is the method of the Communist Party for ameliorating the relationship between the two Parties? As for what is called cooperation not only in the War of Resistance but also in building up the country, what kind of state will actually be founded? What is the relationship between the Three People's Principles and communism? These are very important questions, too, and they comprise another set of questions.

To take yet another example, the world situation is so critical; what will its future trend be? What will be the positive and negative relationships between China's War of Resistance against Japan and the world movement against fascism? These are also important questions, and they are yet another kind of questions.

Furthermore, what is the place of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war? What should the attitude of members of the Communist Party be when they are struggling to apply the political orientation of their Party? What better methods does the Communist Party have for cooperating with other parties, and for maintaining links to the people, in order to make the difficult situation evolve into a favorable situation? What are the internal relations within the Communist Party like? What are the good methods for uniting the whole Party, in order for it to play its great role during the War of Resistance, and in particular during the present difficult situation? What will the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party actually be like? These are also important questions, and they are yet another set of questions.

Both within and without the Party, all these problems urgently demand a solution. For the last few months, we have been constantly encountering people who demanded answers to these questions.

Comrades, our country is a vast and complex country, and right now this country finds itself in a life-and-death struggle against a powerful imperialism. This struggle is now approaching a new stage in its development; it is in the period of transition to a new stage. Our Enlarged Sixth Plenum is being held during this time. The responsibility of the Enlarged Sixth Plenum is extremely heavy; we have to solve many problems.

II. Summary of the Fifteen Months of the War of Resistance

1. What Has the Experience of the Fifteen Months Proved?

Let us start from the experience of the fifteen months.

What has the experience of fifteen months of the War of Resistance given us? In my view, there are three main aspects. First, it has proved that the War of Resistance against Japan is long-term and not short-term; consequently, the strategic orientation of the War of Resistance is protracted war and not a war of quick decision. Second, it has proved that China's War of Resistance can achieve final victory, and that the view of the pessimists is unfounded. Third, it has proved that the single correct road for sustaining a long-term war and obtaining final victory, to which there is no alternative, lies in uniting the whole nation, striving to make progress, and relying on the popular masses to overcome difficulties and achieve victory.

2. The War of Resistance Against Japan Is Long-Term and Not Short-Term; the Strategic Orientation Is Protracted War and Not Quick Victory

When the War of Resistance began, many people, judging not from the basic comparison between the forces of the enemy and our own forces, but from certain one-time and superficial phenomena, imagined that the war would soon be resolved. For a time, the idea of a quick victory hovered around. Last year, however, on the October 10 holiday, Chairman Chiang clearly pointed out: "This War of Resistance cannot be resolved in a year or so, but must go through extreme bitterness and hardship before we can achieve the final victory." We also pointed out at a very early stage the long-term nature of the War of Resistance against Japan, and that it absolutely could not be resolved in a short time. "The result of the war will be that Japan will definitely be defeated, and China will definitely be victorious. The sacrifices will, however, be severe, and we will go through a very painful period." (Mao Zedong's Talk with Snow, July 16, 1936).¹ "It should be seen that this War of Resistance is an arduous and protracted war." (Decision on the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, August 15, 1937).² All these statements point out: the War of

1. For Snow's version of the passage referred to here, see Volume V, p. 259. The substance of the two sentences Mao cites is basically the same, but they are preceded by the statement that, if the Chinese People's Front is homogeneous, if international aid to China is considerable, and if revolution comes quickly in Japan, "the war will be short and victory speedily won." Two years later, he was less optimistic.

2. The reference is to paragraph 7 of a document drafted on August 15, 1937, and formally adopted at the Luochuan Conference on August 25. The Chinese text can be found in *Central Committee Documents*, Vol. 11, pp. 324-26. For a translation, see Saich, *Rise to Power*, p. 791.

Resistance against Japan is a long-term and not a short-term war; the strategic orientation is protracted war and not a war of quick decision. The fifteen-month experience of the War of Resistance has completely proved their correctness.

Where is the reason for this to be found? It is to be found in the fact that the enemy is strong, and we are weak; the enemy is in a dominant position, and we are in an inferior position; the enemy is an imperialist country, and we are a semicolonial country.

We pointed out long ago that defeating imperialist Japan requires three conditions. The first is progress by China, which is the basic and primary thing. The second is difficulties for Japan. The third is international support. Let us take a look at what these conditions have already been like during the fifteen months of the War of Resistance. In a word, there is already a basis, but it is still very far from reaching the necessary level.

Take the first condition (the basic and primary condition for defeating the enemy). As regards progress by China, after fifteen months there is indeed a basis, but only if there is continuous progress can the enemy finally be defeated. What we call progress by China includes every aspect—domestic politics, military affairs, Party affairs, mass movements, culture, education, and so on. The progress of these aspects has been very notable during the last fifteen months. Nevertheless, we still cannot stop the enemy's attacks and execute our counterattacks simply by using these already existing things. A counterattack requires a period of preparation, as well as an effort by the whole nation, in which all the vital forces in our nation are mobilized broadly and profoundly. Only thus will a counterattack and victory over the enemy become possible. Therefore, the doctrine of quick victory has no foundation. It leaves out of account the peculiarity that the enemy is strong and we are weak; it ignores the fact that the enemy is in a dominant position, while we are in an inferior position, and that the enemy is an imperialist country, while we are a semicolonial country. China possesses great hidden potential. If it is mobilized, it is sufficient to turn our defeat into victory, to turn weakness into strength, and to change fundamentally relations between the enemy and ourselves. But this depends upon our future efforts; it is not yet an established fact.

The same is true of the second condition, Japan's difficulties. During these fifteen months, the enemy dispatched a million troops; their casualties amounted to several hundred thousand, and their expenditures reached several hundred million;³ day by day the edge was taken off their troops' spirit, and their finances and economy became impoverished. Various currents of world opinion have condemned them one after the other, and all of this is the result of Japan's brutal aggression and China's brave resistance. All these existing difficulties for the enemy are, however, still insufficient to stop his attacks and to benefit our counterattack. We must wait until the enemy has greater difficulties and we have made greater progress; it is only then that the opportunity will come to counterattack and defeat the enemy.

3. Most likely several hundred million yen, but not specifically stated.

Consequently, the theory of rapid victory has no basis either in the enemy's situation. The experience of these fifteen months has already proved this.

As regards the third condition, international support for us, we have not yet reached the most beneficial time. During the past fifteen months, we have gained widespread support from world opinion. The Soviet Union and other democratic countries, on the basis of resolutions by the League of Nations, have already provided us with a lot of help, proving that we are not isolated. Nevertheless, we must see that the various countries in the international peace front find themselves in differing circumstances. In capitalist countries, the people support us, but their governments adopt a neutral attitude to some degree. Their bourgeoisie takes advantage of war to do business; moreover, they are sending large quantities of munitions, and of raw materials for munitions, to Japan. The socialist countries differ fundamentally from the capitalist countries, as has already been shown concretely with regard to support for China. But the international situation does not yet allow them to provide support beyond the present level. Therefore, we must definitely not expect too much from international support for the time being. It is undoubtedly quite wrong to abandon the orientation of self-reliance and place our hopes principally in external support. The experience of these fifteen months has proved that the only correct way is to rely primarily on ourselves, but at the same time not to relax our striving to obtain external support. On this point, our past experience has also negated the theory of rapid victory.

In general, whether we look at the matter from the Chinese side, the enemy side, or the international side, our experience of the past fifteen months has proved that the views predicting rapid victory have absolutely no foundation. On the contrary, this experience has revealed the protracted and bitter nature of the war. Therefore, our strategic orientation absolutely cannot be toward a war of quick conclusion, but toward protracted war. To defeat the enemy in a protracted war—this is the only correct orientation for the War of Resistance against Japan. Those who did not believe in this orientation in the past have now received a clear lesson from experience, and they should not have any further doubts!

3. Final Victory Belongs to China; Pessimism Is Entirely Unfounded

Prior to the War of Resistance, the theory that weapons alone decide the outcome of war was very popular. It was believed that China was inferior in weapons to others and would surely lose the war if it were to fight, and China would surely become another Abyssinia. Although outwardly talk along these lines disappeared after the beginning of the war, secretly it continued to be prevalent. Whenever there is a critical moment in the war, such a view will manifest itself once again. It holds that China must stop fighting and carry on peace negotiations: China can fight no more, and if it continues the war it will surely perish. We, however, take the opposite view. We consider that, although China is indeed inferior to others in weapons, weapons can be strengthened by human efforts, and ultimately victory or defeat in a war is determined mainly by people, rather than by things. The

conclusion of a protracted war depends on the efforts of the whole nation. Assuredly China can gradually overcome its own defects, enhance its own strength, turn the passive into the active, turn the inferior situation into the superior. Meanwhile, the difficulties of the enemy must gradually increase, and in the international context aid to us must also gradually increase. Summing up all these factors, we will definitely be able to defeat Japanese imperialism in the end. Chairman Chiang long ago clearly declared, "Since the war has begun, the only way we have is to risk the life of the entire nation and sacrifice ourselves to the end; there is no reason to stop and compromise halfway through" (speech at Lushan in July of last year). "This War of Resistance is unavoidable in the course of the national revolution. The war of the invaded nation against the invaders for independence and survival is very different from the usual war among participants of equal strength. Therefore it does not depend upon weapons and military preparation, but relies instead on a strong and unyielding revolutionary spirit, and a strong and unshakable national consciousness" (open letter to the nation in December last year). The Chinese Communist Party also long since pointed out, "Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long expensive occupation of China, and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the Chinese people will still be pouring men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines long after the tidal flood of Japanese imperialism has wrecked itself on the hidden reefs of Chinese resistance. All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China" (Mao Zedong's talk with Edgar Snow).⁴ "We are confident that the War of Resistance which has already been launched will break through all the obstacles and continue to move forward, thanks to the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country. . . . Provided only that we can truly organize the masses in their millions into the Anti-Japanese National Front, there will be no doubt regarding the victory of the War of Resistance" (Decision of the Chinese Communist Party in August of last year).⁵ All these [statements] have been borne out by the experience of the past fifteen months. The absurd theories of people who are pessimistic or defeatist, and believe that China will be conquered because the enemy is too strong to be resisted, and that China cannot afford such a war, and compromise is the only way out, and so on, have already been proved completely wrong.

4. This quotation is from Mao's interview with Snow on Japanese imperialism, July 16, 1936, already cited above. The version of this passage in the Chinese text of "On the New Stage" does not correspond precisely to Snow's English text as reproduced in Volume V, p. 266, but since the substance is essentially the same, and no independent record of these interviews in Chinese exists, we have inserted Snow's version here.

5. The reference is once again to the "Decision of the Central Committee on Present Conditions and the Party's Task," adopted on August 25, 1937. The quotations are taken from points 7 and 8 of this document. See *Central Committee Documents*, Vol. 11, pp. 324-26, and the translation in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 791-92.

What are the reasons? Because it is only one aspect of the reality that the enemy is strong and we are weak; the enemy still has weak points, and China still has strong points.

What, then, are the weak points of our enemy? First, it is a relatively small country, it does not have enough troops or financial capability, and cannot afford a protracted drain [on these resources]. Because of its lack of military forces, and also because in the face of China's resolute resistance it must disperse and expend them, it will be impossible for Japan to occupy the whole of China. Moreover, even in the areas it does occupy, it can in reality hold only the big cities and the major roads, and some flat regions. The rest will still be under Chinese control. Second, the enemy's war is imperialist in character and is retrogressive. Its internal contradictions force it to carry out wars of aggression and, moreover, forced it to adopt an extremely barbaric policy of pillage. As a result, Japan's war has, on the one hand, become a war of absolute confrontation against the Chinese people as a whole, forcing all Chinese, no matter of which class, party, or faction, to unite together and fight this resistance war resolutely. On the other hand, it has also become a war of absolute confrontation against the broad popular masses in its own country. The eventual consequence of the Japanese imperialists' putting all their manpower and financial capacity into the war has been the gradual brewing of discontent among the people within the country and among the soldiers at the front. If the war continues to develop, there is no doubt that there will be a trend forcing the broad masses of its own people and of the ordinary soldiers to fight against the war itself in a resolute way. These have begun to be proved in the past fifteen months. This point, which exists on the side of the enemy itself, is the most important factor which will necessarily lead to its defeat. Third, it is precisely because the enemy's war is imperialist in character, or, to put it differently, because it aims to benefit itself at the expense of others, that it cannot fail to put it in a position of confrontation vis-à-vis those countries which have opposite interests. Apart from one or two fascist countries, all countries, and especially their broad popular masses, all disapprove of Japan's war of aggression. Thus, Japan is obliged to reduce its sphere of international activities and is becoming more isolated day by day. This has also begun to be proved in the past fifteen months.

Thus the small size of Japan as a country, which causes its deficiency in military force and financial capability; the retrogressive character of Japan's war; and Japan's isolated international status—these three combined at the same time represent the innate weaknesses and difficulties of the Japanese war. Moreover, these weaknesses and difficulties are still developing every day. The capitulationists and pessimists are blind to all this; they do not see these at all but, instead, see only one thing: the enemy is strong, and we are weak. So capitulationism and pessimism have no basis in the enemy's situation, and their policy of compromise can only be a policy of the destruction of the state. We believe in the theory of ultimate victory. Our views are based on abundant evidence in terms of the enemy's situation, and the experience of the past fifteen months has begun to verify them.

What are our advantages? In the first place, we are a big country with a vast territory and abundant resources, a large population, and large military forces. Although the enemy has occupied our major big cities and lines of communication, we still have large areas of land to serve as our base areas in sustaining a protracted war of resistance and striving for final victory. Even in the enemy-occupied regions, we still have many base areas for guerrilla warfare. This characteristic is utterly different from those that obtain in small countries such as Czechoslovakia and Belgium. This is our first advantage. In the second place, our Resistance War against Japan today is unlike the wars in all the periods of Chinese history. Our war is a national revolutionary war and a progressive war. Not only is the character of the war itself progressive, but this war is being waged on a progressive foundation without parallel in China's past. China in the fourth decade of the twentieth century is different from China in any other historical period. We have progressive people, progressive political parties, and a progressive army unlike those in any other historic periods. The national revolutionary War of Resistance against Japan that is being waged on this basis contains within itself great forces that can continue to develop and progress. This is the foundation that we have on our side and which will enable us to sustain a protracted war and win final victory. The experience of fifteen months has proved that the great, sacred national revolutionary war that is being waged on the original progressive basis has already pushed forward progress in the whole of China. The old, corrupt national tradition is being destroyed, new national progressive forces are growing, and a great process of unity, unification, progress, and development of the entire nation is moving forward to completion. China before the War of Resistance was different from China after the War of Resistance, and everyone with eyes can see this. Furthermore, it can already be predicted that China in the first period of the War of Resistance (at present, this period is still not over) will be different from China in the period after the War of Resistance. In the third place, moreover, our War of Resistance against the Japanese is not isolated. Even though the capitalist countries are still maintaining many of their contradictory policies, and even though the international situation may temporarily affect the degree of assistance from other countries, China's War of Resistance against the Japanese and the worldwide struggle against aggression and fascism are inseparably linked. It is not only the Chinese who are waging war against Japanese aggression; Europeans, Americans, Africans, Australians, and other Asians are also doing so. The sympathy and assistance from various nations all over the world in the past fifteen months have given us this conviction. China, which depends mainly on self-reliance, can at the same time cooperate with the assistance from the world, because the world today is no longer the world of the past. Progressive humanity throughout the world has become one entity bound together by a common cause, and the enemy's attempt to isolate us can only be in vain.

Thus, we are a very big country, our war is a progressive war, and, in addition, we have international assistance, and these three things are all combined at the same time. These are all favorable conditions for us, and they not only exist, but

are developing day by day. Here again, the capitulationists and pessimists are also blind. They see nothing of this and see only that we are a weak country, in an unfavorable situation, and that we are a semicolony. They murmur their nonsense of "The War of Resistance will lead to the destruction of the country," and "If we continue to fight the country will be destroyed." Among them, many bad elements, on the basis of such nonsense, are secretly carrying out their conspiracies of surrender and compromise. We are quite different. On the basis of those things that have been proved correct during the experience of the past fifteen months, we want to point out explicitly to the entire Party and the entire nation the strengths and weaknesses of our nation and of our war, the favorable and unfavorable conditions. Moreover, we must point out that the advantages and favorable conditions are predominant in the war as a whole, call on the whole nation to struggle hard, develop our strong points, strengthen our advantages, overcome our shortcomings and unfavorable conditions, and struggle for final victory. To whom will victory ultimately belong? We now give a definite answer: to China. On this basis we determine our policies: are we going to fight a resolute war of resistance, or are we going to waver and compromise? We give a definite reply: there must never be wavering and compromise, the only way out is a resolute war of resistance. It is obvious that neither the loss of the Four Northeastern Provinces, nor the subjugation of Austria, nor the partition of Czechoslovakia came about because of a war of resistance. It is the same now. Under the many favorable conditions for China, the War of Resistance is sure to prevail, but if we choose the path of compromise, the destruction of the state and the extinction of the race are unavoidable. For this reason, to oppose firmly the theory of compromise and pessimism, and call on all the people to fight to the very end is our one and only orientation.

In sum, the contradiction between the facts that the enemy is strong and we are weak has determined the long-term character of the war, and the strategic orientation of a protracted war. We are partisans of the theory of defeating the enemy in a protracted war, not of the theory of a quick victory. The enemy is small, and we are big; the enemy's war is retrogressive, while our war is progressive; the enemy's international position is relatively isolated, while we are relatively capable of obtaining foreign support. These pairs of contradictory contrasts also determine the fact that final victory in the war will belong to us, and not to the enemy. This is the second summary of the experience of the War of Resistance during the past fifteen months.

4. The Only Way to Sustain a Long-Term War and Strive for Final Victory Lies in Uniting and Gathering Together the Entire Nation, Striving to Advance, and Relying on the Popular Masses

The two basic points that the War of Resistance against Japan will be protracted, and that final victory belongs to China, have already been demonstrated by the experience in the past fifteen months of the War of Resistance. But what are the concrete plans for sustaining a long-term war and gaining final victory? Regard-

ing this, there have been disagreements among our compatriots in the past. Many think that it will be all right to go on in the old way. They do not pay attention to uniting the whole country and do not pay attention to improvements in various matters such as military affairs, politics, culture, Party affairs, and popular movements. They even go so far as to increase friction and obstruct progress. In the past we have never approved of such ideas but, instead, have considered that only the unity and progress of the whole nation and reliance on the popular masses can sustain a long-term war and secure final victory. Otherwise, it will be impossible. In its "Program for the War of Resistance and Building the Country," the Guomindang explicitly points out: "If we want to ensure victory in the War of Resistance and success in building the country, though this depends on the efforts of the comrades in our party, it requires above all hard work, the union of hearts, and sharing of the burden by the people of the whole country." The Chinese Communist Party also pointed out a long time ago: "The most central task during the War of Resistance is to mobilize all the forces to win victory in the War of Resistance. Moreover, the central key to winning victory in the War of Resistance lies in developing the already mobilized War of Resistance into an all-out War of Resistance of the entire nation. Only such an all-out War of Resistance of the entire nation can lead to final victory" (Decision by the Chinese Communist Party in August of last year).⁶ These [views] are absolutely correct; the experience of the past fifteen months has proved it.

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, all the mutually opposing classes, parties, factions, and cliques have been united; all the different regions and armies have been unified under the command of the National Government and the Military Affairs Commission. Without this unity and solidarity, it would have been impossible to sustain the War of Resistance during the past fifteen months. And only because of the War of Resistance has it been possible to unite and rally around all sides. Such uniting as one constitutes the anti-Japanese national front. But the experience of the past fifteen months has also demonstrated to us the seriousness of the enemy's conspiracy to sabotage and the inadequacy of our internal unity. Why has the War of Resistance suffered so many setbacks? Why have we hitherto been unable to stop the offensives of the enemy and carry out our counteroffensive? Apart from the objective reasons, the inadequate strength of the united front and the fact that it has still not attained the necessary scope and solidity are the most important reasons. From this we learn that only by further uniting and consolidating the whole nation, and strengthening and consolidating the Anti-Japanese National United Front, can we sustain a protracted war and win final victory. This is the first point. Second, the resistance in the past fifteen months not only has pushed forward the unity of the whole nation, but has also exposed the various

6. This passage, like those cited above in sections I.2 and I.3, is taken from the August 25, 1937, "Decision of the Central Committee on Present Conditions and the Party's Task." See paragraphs 3 and 5 in *Central Committee Documents*, Vol. 11, pp. 324-25; translated in Saich, *Rise to Power*, p. 791.

respects in which this unity is inadequate. Moreover, while pushing forward progress in the various aspects such as military, political, cultural, Party affairs, and the people's movement, it also revealed the shortcomings in these respects. To sustain the protracted war and win final victory, we must mobilize all the vital forces in all social categories in the whole nation, and if we want to achieve this goal, it will be impossible to do so without striving to make progress in the domains of military affairs, politics, culture, party affairs, and people's movements. Without greater progress in these various aspects we will not be able to mobilize all the vital forces in the whole nation, nor will we be able to make further progress in uniting the whole nation as one. Third, the War of Resistance during the past fifteen months has also proved the greatness of the assistance from the popular masses to the forces of the War of Resistance; at the same time, it has also demonstrated that the mobilization of the strength of the popular masses has just begun, and as a result of the failure to obtain extensive assistance from the popular masses for the War of Resistance, it has suffered many setbacks. From this we must draw the lesson that our compatriots must better understand the basic point that the War of Resistance depends on the popular masses. By relying on the popular masses, we will be able to overcome all difficulties, and defeat all enemies, however powerful; if we are detached from the popular masses, we will not be able to succeed in anything. China's progress in the future must be fully expressed in mobilizing the forces of the popular masses.

In short, the only correct way to sustain a protracted war and win final victory lies in the firm and broad solidarity of the entire nation, in striving to advance by mobilizing the vital forces of the entire nation, and by relying on the popular masses to overcome difficulties. This is our third conclusion.

Comrades, persist in the War of Resistance, persist in the protracted war, and strive to unite and to make progress—this is the basic lesson of the past fifteen months of the War of Resistance, and it is also the overall orientation for the War of Resistance from this time forward. We can defeat the enemy, provided only that we and the entire nation adhere to this orientation and make extensive efforts over the long term. The War of Resistance against Japan is developing toward a new stage, during which there are many new tasks, but this overall orientation will not change. The experience of the past fifteen months constitutes the foundation on which we will observe the new situation and put forward new tasks.

III. The New Stage in the Development of the National Resistance War Against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front

1. The Study of the Laws of the War and of the United Front Is the Foundation for Policy Decisions

Comrades, after summarizing past experience, the important question is to look at the tendency of the development of the present situation. How will the War of Resistance against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front evolve from

the past basis? This is a question we must answer now; this is very important in solving our present problems. Because if we do not have a general estimate about the process of change and development of the War of Resistance against Japan, we can only be entangled by the war and let the war tie us hand and foot, instead of putting the war under our control, making adjustments and arrangements, creating the necessary conditions for the war, leading the war in the direction we desire, and achieving victory in the war. Therefore we must understand the laws of the War of Resistance against Japan, for only then can we exercise strategic guidance over it, and decide on all the strategies, tactics, policies, plans, and schemes which serve the war. The same is true of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; only when we have studied and understood its laws can we effectively push the united front onto the track of solid development and let it play its role as a pillar of victory in the war.

Let us first talk about the problem of war.

2. Specific Historic Conditions, and the Superiority or Inferiority of the Subjective Capacity, Determine the Process of Development of the War

Some wars in history have ended after a single stage. For example, the war between Japan and Russia in 1905 was over after the attack of the Japanese armies and the defeat and retreat of the Russian armies. Another example was the war between Italy and Abyssinia, which came to an end after the attack by Italy and the defeat of Abyssinia. The same was true of the Chinese war against the northern warlords, which began in 1926. This is one type. It is because, on the one hand, the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides and, on the other hand, the superiority and inferiority of their leadership capacity make them no match for each other. This is the first category of war. Wars of the second category end after two stages. Take the war between France and Russia, for instance. Napoleon went from attack to retreat; Russia went from retreat to attack. There were two stages for both sides. In ancient China, the famous battle of the Red Cliff between [the states of] Wu and Wei, and the battle at Feishui between [the states of] Qin and Jin were like this. Although the two sides were different in strength and weakness, the weak side was good at using other good and favorable conditions and provided correct leadership. Thus they followed the retreat with counteroffensives and defeated the enemy. But there is still the third category of war, for instance, the Seven Years' War, the Eight Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, and the Hundred Years' War in foreign countries or even the great European war of twenty years ago, lasting four years (especially as manifested on the Western front). All of these had three stages. Side A attacks, and side B retreats; this is the first period. Both sides are locked in stalemate, which lasts for quite a long time; this is the second period. Side B launches a counteroffensive, and side A retreats; this is the third period. There have been many such wars in Chinese history, too. The characteristic of this kind of war is that there is a relatively long or very long period of stalemate; this is also the

consequence of the specific historical conditions and of the characteristics of the cliques leading the war.

Which category does the Sino-Japanese war fall into? In my opinion, it falls into the third category. This is a result of the different historical conditions of the two sides and of the particular circumstances of the different leading cliques of the war on the two sides.

3. The Long-Term Character of the Sino-Japanese War Is Shown in the Three Stages of the War

The long-term character of the Sino-Japanese war will be manifested in the three stages of the enemy's offensive, stalemate, and retreat, on the one hand, and our defensive, stalemate, and counteroffensive, on the other. Because the enemy is strong and we are weak (the enemy is in a superior position, we are in an inferior position; the enemy is an imperialist country, we are a semicolonial country), the result is a first stage during which the enemy attacks and we are on the defensive. If we do not speak of retreat, but rather of defense, this is to express the idea of retreat through a strategic mobile defense, an attitude of step-by-step resistance, instead of a sudden and clear-cut retreat. Nonetheless, under the specific conditions that the enemy is a small, backward country which enjoys little assistance, while we are a big, progressive country, which receives much assistance, our heroic War of Resistance has also caused the enemy to suffer scattered difficulties and debilitating losses in the course of his offensive, so that he had to end his strategic offensive at a certain time and move to a stage of protecting and preserving his occupied territory militarily and attacking us politically and through economic blockade. During this period, though the enemy has been worn down, for the time being he has not yet been worn down sufficiently to lead to his defeat. Although we are resolutely waging the War of Resistance, and making progress in every respect, we are unable to change all at once to such an extent that we can launch a counteroffensive and drive the enemy out of our country. For all the above reasons, a second stage of stalemate between the two sides, or an intermediate stage, takes shape. Because during the second stage the enemy's difficulties and our progress are increasing daily, and also taking into account the fact that the international situation is favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy, these factors will eventually change the original situation in which the enemy is strong but we are weak, and the enemy is in a superior position but we are in an inferior position. Eventually, it will develop into a situation which will become more and more disadvantageous to the enemy and favorable to us. First will come a period of equilibrium between us and the enemy, and then a period when we are superior. Then we can move on to the third stage of our counteroffensive and the enemy's retreat.

The above views about the three stages constitute a prediction about the entire process of the war based on the contrast between the existing and possible future specific conditions on both sides. It is not yet a fact, but only a possible tendency. On the basis of our subjective efforts, we must create the necessary conditions for

such a possible tendency, and then we can change the possible tendency into reality. Nevertheless, relying on the existing conditions, plus correct guidance and the great strenuous efforts of the entire nation, we will be able to turn this possible tendency into reality.

4. People Who Believe in a Quick Victory and Those Who Believe in National Subjugation Are All Opposed to This Estimate

People who believe in a quick victory oppose the theory of three stages, and think that we can quickly start a counteroffensive, and no intervening period is necessary. This is wrong. There are many difficulties in the War of Resistance against Japan, we need a certain period of time in order to overcome these difficulties, and it is impossible to launch a counteroffensive quickly. The reason they believe in a quick victory is that they underestimate the strength of the enemy, on the one hand, and overestimate our own forces, on the other hand. Those who believe the nation will be subjugated are also against the theory of three periods. They think that stalemate as well as a counteroffensive are impossible and that China is only another Abyssinia. This is wrong. Unlike those who believe in a quick victory, they overestimate the strength of the enemy but underestimate our own strength. They see only darkness before them. They acknowledge that China will be subjugated and that our resistance and efforts are useless. In their view, it is impossible to reach a stalemate between the enemy and ourselves, let alone a counteroffensive and the defeat of the enemy. Thus, only if we oppose the theory of a quick victory, on the one hand, and the theory of national subjugation, on the other, can we persist in our theory of three stages. At present it is more important to oppose the theory of national subjugation than to oppose the theory of a quick victory. There are still some people who support a protracted war with their words, but are against the theory of three stages. This is not right either. Where are the so-called protracted war and the so-called long-term war reflected? They are manifested in the three stages of the war. If they support protracted or long-term war, but disapprove of the three stages, then the so-called protracted and long term are abstract things without any content or reality. Hence they cannot provide any real strategic guidance or any real policy in the War of Resistance. Actually, this idea also belongs to the theory of a quick victory, and is simply disguised as a version of "protracted war."

5. The Relationship Between the Theory of the Three Stages and the International Situation

When the Zhanggaofeng Incident⁷ took place, a portion of public opinion was overjoyed. They thought that if war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union,

7. See above, the relevant note to the text of August 13, 1938.

China could move to the counteroffensive without fighting a protracted war. According to this point of view, the theory of the three stages naturally could not hold water, and our predictions would be wrong. This is a kind of thinking that depends mainly on foreign assistance and is one variety of the theory of a quick victory. Nonetheless, the international situation does not develop according to the subjective wishes of these friends but, rather, according to its own laws. The major center of the world is in Europe, and the East is an important part of the area surrounding it. The major countries in the peace front and the major fascist countries in the world are just now quarreling endlessly about the crisis of war in Europe, and the problems in Europe are all tangled up. No matter whether it is the eve of war between the big powers in Europe or war breaks out, the big and small countries of Europe will all put the resolution of the problems in Europe at the top of their agenda, so for the time being the problems in the East must come second. Looking at the Sino-Japanese war from this perspective as well, the theory of a quick counteroffensive is not reasonable either. We must rely principally on ourselves. Not only are we not afraid of the three periods, but we are about to create three periods. The three stages represent the pattern of the Sino-Japanese war. This is based not only on the balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves but also on the international situation.

6. *The Stage of Stalemate Is the Pivot of the War*

The major characteristic of the three stages lies in the inclusion of a transitional middle stage. That is, first our resistance must try by every possible means to stop the offensive of the enemy. If the enemy's offensive cannot be stopped in a certain period of time and in a certain region, there will not be the so-called three stages that are different in character. Second, when the stage of the stalemate comes, we must try our best to prepare all the necessary conditions for our counteroffensive. If we cannot do this, we will not be able to proceed to the stage of the counteroffensive, it can only be a continuous stalemate, and there will be no so-called three stages. Here, to those who believe in a quick victory, we definitely say that only if there is such a transitional period can we unite the entire nation, overcome the difficulties, foster new forces, and, in conjunction with the difficulties of the enemy and international aid, carry out a counteroffensive and drive the enemy out of our country. Otherwise it is impossible. Looking at the problem from the point of view of self-reliance, we will unavoidably come to this conclusion. To those who talk about national subjugation and who are pessimistic, we confidently say that only this transitional stage is the pivot of the entire war. Whether China becomes a colony or is going to be liberated depends not on the loss of the big cities and important lines of communication in the first stage but, rather, on the level of effort of the whole nation. The loss of big cities and important communication lines is regrettable; it increases the strength of the enemy and reduces our strength. But many of the things that have not been lost can still serve as our resources in defeating the

enemy. It does no good to mourn the loss of treasures. The territory and the various active forces we preserved during the first period, especially the progress in fields such as military affairs, politics, culture, Party affairs, and people's movements, are the most valuable things, and they are the foundation for continued progress and preparation for a counteroffensive in the second stage. In spite of that, they are merely the foundations for continued progress and preparation for a counteroffensive; they cannot determine the counteroffensive. What will determine the counteroffensive are the forces which are added in the second stage. The counteroffensive will be empty talk without the addition of great newly emerging forces.

7. *The Characteristics of the Three Stages: The First Stage*

The characteristics of the three stages of the War of Resistance against Japan have already appeared. It is necessary to point out in a general way those that have not appeared but can be predicted, for they have an important influence on the guidance of the war and the making of policy.

What are the characteristics and important symbols of the first stage?

First, on the Chinese side: the formation of a national united front, the participation in the war by all the armies in the country, the resolute character of the War of Resistance, the publication by the Guomindang of the Guiding Principles for the War of Resistance and Building the Country, the meeting of the People's Political Council, the acquisition of legitimate status by the Chinese Communist Party and other parties, the creation of guerrilla warfare, the progress of all the country's armies, the development of the movements of the popular masses, and so on. These are all major events which denote progress on the Chinese side. Meanwhile, however, there are many disadvantageous events and bad phenomena, such as, for instance, the loss of major cities, important communication lines and major industries and businesses, the loss of territory and population, the imbalance of progress in the country (the progress in some regions is very slow), and the fact that generally speaking the political system has just begun to move toward democratization, the existence of diehard elements and of corruption, the brewing of the compromising tendency, and so on.

Second, on the enemy's side: the drain of military strength and financial capability, the condemnation by international opinion, the worsening of military discipline, the relative decline of the fighting capacity of the armies, the development of dissatisfaction among the people in the country and among the soldiers at the front, the defeat in the battle of Zhanggaofeng, the difficulty in organizing an army of Chinese traitors, and the incapacity of those that have been organized, and so on. These are all big events showing his difficulties. At the same time, however, there are things which show his capacity, namely, the firmness of his offense, the persistence of his military forces, the enlargement of his occupied territory, the persistence of his capacity for political organization, the strength of his conspiratorial agencies, and so on.

Third, on the international side: the growth of the movement to assist China, the increasing strength of the forces of the Soviet Union and its assistance to China, these are all things that favor China. Yet there are other also things: the development of the war in Europe, a certain tendency toward compromise between Britain and Japan, the assistance in military raw materials to our enemy by other countries. These are all disadvantageous to China.

Many of the above things concerning China, Japan, and the international situation are characteristics that have emerged in the past fifteen months during the first stage of the War of Resistance.

8. *The Second Stage*

Supposing that Wuhan cannot be defended, many new things will emerge in the situation of the war. Although the capture of Wuhan by the enemy in no sense represents the end of the old stage and the beginning of a new stage, from now on, when the enemy can still continue his offensive until he is forced to stop it, this period is still a transitional stage from the old stage to the new. In spite of that, after the loss of Wuhan becomes a fact, many new circumstances will manifest themselves.

After the loss of Wuhan, as well as during most of the time in the new stage, the basic situation that can be predicted will be, on the one hand, more difficulties, but, on the other hand, more progress. This is the primary characteristic of the new stage.

The increased difficulties will manifest themselves in the following respects: (1) Because of the loss of the principal large cities and important communication lines, the political power of the state and the battlefields will be separated geographically by the action of the enemy, and as a consequence many problems will arise; (2) extreme difficulties in finances and in the economy; (3) a certain degree of compromise between Britain and Japan (or, on the contrary, there may be further conflict between Britain and Japan if Japan insists on occupying alone and threatening Southeast Asia); (4) if the enemy attacks Guangzhou, China's most important communication line by sea may be cut off, and as a result international assistance may decrease temporarily and partially; (5) there is the possibility of the formation of a national puppet political régime and its possible influence on the anti-Japanese front; (6) the possibility that some faction in the anti-Japanese front may betray us, and an increase in the atmosphere of compromise; (7) an increase in pessimistic sentiments, and in phenomena of disagreement, and so on. These are all possible new events that may add new difficulties to the War of Resistance against Japan. To predict these difficulties will help us to overcome them by preparation and planning.

Progress will be expressed in the following respects: (1) The orientation of resolutely persisting in the War of Resistance put forward by Chairman Chiang and the Guomindang and their further political progress; (2) improvement of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, the con-

solidation and enlargement of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; (3) progress in the work of reforming the army; (4) the expansion and development of guerrilla warfare; (5) progress in the democratization of the state; (6) greater development of the movements of the popular masses; (7) the carrying out of the new wartime financial and economic policies; (8) raising the level of culture and education in the anti-Japanese war; (9) the continuation of assistance from the Soviet Union and its possible increase, and a more friendly and intimate relationship between China and the Soviet Union, and so on.

The entire second stage is the stage of stalemate; it is the preparatory stage for a Chinese counteroffensive. The length of this period depends on the degree of change in the enemy's strength as well as our own and the evolution of the international environment. Nevertheless, we should prepare for a long war. If we can survive this hard and difficult journey, the smooth road to victory will come.

During the second stage, although the enemy and we are strategically in a stalemate, there will still be extensive warfare. This will manifest itself chiefly in defense at the front by the main forces, but extensive guerrilla warfare will develop in the enemy's rear. By then, the guerrilla warfare in many strategically important regions will become very bitter, and we must start to prepare for such difficulties now.

9. *The Third Stage*

The concrete situation cannot be predicted. But by then the preparations for our counteroffensive must have been completed; at the same time, the level of difficulties for the enemy will have greatly increased, and the international situation will greatly favor us. By then the situation of the war will not be one of strategic defensive or strategic stalemate, but one of strategic counteroffensive; it will not be a strategic internal front but a strategic external front. At that time there must be great progress in our domestic politics and new military technology. Otherwise, a counteroffensive will be impossible.

10. *Defending Wuhan Is a Question of Gaining Time, Not One of Defending the City to the Death*

The purpose of the struggle to defend Wuhan is to drain the enemy, on the one hand, and win time, on the other, so that the work in the whole country will make progress, and not a last-ditch defense of a strong point. When the time comes that the war situation has proved that giving it up will be more favorable to us, we should adopt the principle of giving up territory to preserve our military strength. Therefore we must avoid big and unprofitable decisive battles. Strategically decisive battles should not take place in the first and second stages. They will obstruct both persistence in the war of resistance and the preparation for a counteroffensive. Hence they must be avoided. It should be one of our orientations in a protracted war to avoid strategically decisive battles and to try our best to fight decisive

campaigns and battles under favorable conditions. To give up some of the cities which we cannot defend at certain times and under certain conditions is not only unavoidable, but it is an active policy to lure the enemy deep, disperse him, drain him, and wear him out. Under the general premise of persisting in the War of Resistance, without compromise or surrender, it is perfectly permissible, in accordance with the policy of a protracted war, to give up some strongholds at proper times, and we should not be surprised at this.

11. To Proceed from the Present to the Stage of Stalemate

This will benefit our preparation for a counteroffensive only when the enemy's offensive is stopped. But in order to achieve this objective, we must make a greater effort. Hence it is still a process of struggle to proceed from the present to the time when the enemy has to stop his strategic offensive and change into defending his occupied territory, and the period of stalemate will emerge, and there are many difficulties to be overcome before we can achieve this. Because after the capture of Wuhan the enemy will not stop his offensive. It is certain that he still wants to attack Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Hengzhou, Wuzhou, Beihai, Nanchang, Shantou, Fuzhou, and the nearby regions. If we want to stop the offensive of the enemy, we must continue to carry out strategic mobile defense warfare to confront this attempt of the enemy, and make the greatest efforts to fight persistent wars to drain the enemy as much as we can without suffering any losses to the enemy, so that the enemy will be forced to stop his offensive and shift the war situation into the phase of a stalemate, which is beneficial to us.

12. But the Situation of a Stalemate Will Come Soon

After the enemy has captured Wuhan, his weakness, resulting from an insufficient number of troops and the dispersal of his forces, will become even more apparent. If he still wants to attack Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Hengzhou, Wuzhou, Beihai, Nanchang, Shantou, Fuzhou, and other places, and occupy them by force, the extreme difficulties caused by the insufficiency and dispersal of his troops will surely reach their highest point during the period of this offensive. At this point, the phenomena of the stubborn resistance of our main forces at the front, and the threat of our guerrillas in the broad rear areas, when added to the insufficiency of the enemy's troops (they cannot be sufficient) and the dispersal of his troops (they cannot but be dispersed) will create great difficulties. This situation—on the enemy's side, insufficient forces and their dispersal, on our side, defense at the front, and threat to the enemy's rear—is to our great advantage and the enemy's great disadvantage. Of course, as far as the overall comparison between the strength of the enemy and our own is concerned, the fundamental situation that the enemy is strong and in a superior position and we are weak and in an inferior position has not changed; this can be changed only through the extremely hard efforts of our

entire nation in combination with the conditions abroad during a long stage of stalemate. But in his attack upon Wuhan, the enemy's strong forces have been deployed even more extensively. On the one hand, this further deployment of his strong forces has caused us losses, but, meanwhile, it has brought difficulties to the enemy himself. Since the morale of the strong forces of the enemy (which are at the same time his insufficient and dispersed forces) will decline after further extensive deployment, this will inevitably cause his general strategic offensive to reach a peak. We recognize that there will be some remaining strength in the enemy's attack, and, according to our best and most appropriate estimates, this remaining strength is still rather great. Hence, it is highly probable that he will attack places such as Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Nanchang, Wuzhou, and Fuzhou and their surrounding areas, and we must also be prepared for a possible attack on the whole of the railway between Guangdong and Wuhan and the highway between Xi'an and Lanzhou. In spite of that, this will only be a residual threat, compared to the overall strength of the enemy. In terms of its total national strength, Japan has to be on guard against the Soviet Union to the north, the United States to the east, Britain and France to the south, and the people within the country. It has only so much strength; here may be barely enough to be used in China. What is more, extensive wars that must be dealt with at the front and within its occupied territory still exist; the contradictions between Japan and the Soviet Union, between Japan and the United States, between Japan and Britain, and between Japan and France are increasing; the contradictions between the government and the people in the home country, between the officers and the soldiers at the front, and between the vast expenditures and the financial impoverishment are deepening. These are all things that will cause great concern for the enemy. We and the people of the whole country must see these things, not be shocked by the loss of major big cities and important communication lines, assist the government in adjusting the war in the whole country, make dispositions for the battles along the railway between Guangdong and Wuhan and the Longhai line, along the highway between Xi'an and Lanzhou, and in other strategic regions, make dispositions for guerrilla warfare in the enemy's great rear area, seize the weak points where the enemy's forces are insufficient and dispersed, imposing greater losses on him, and causing him to disperse his troops even more, and making the war turn victoriously and definitely into a new state of stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. This is the urgent task facing the whole nation at the moment.

13. The Strength of the Enemy Is Gradually Decreasing, but Our Strength Is Gradually Increasing

Has the enemy's strength increased or not? Compared to his original strength, there is no increase; on the contrary, his strength has decreased very greatly. The enemy's original military and economic strength has been greatly drained. During the past fifteen months of war, his military forces suffered casualties of several

hundred thousand, used up large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and matériel, suffered the destruction of several hundred airplanes and more than a hundred warships, and spent several billion yuan on military expenses. This drain is unprecedented in Japanese history. The enemy will have to use up a great deal more strength before he is forced to stop the strategic offensive. As far as this is concerned, his ally Hitler has been greatly worried for some time. And yet, is there no increase in the enemy's strength at all? Yes, there is. It consists in the occupation of the major big Chinese cities, important communication lines, and some parts of the countryside. The enemy has taken over the markets from the other countries and from the Chinese national capitalists, seized natural resources, instruments of production, and considerable manpower from China. This is the only purpose of the Japanese war. Temporarily it has added these things to itself. But the question is: can these things compensate for the losses already suffered in the war? No, they cannot; all the "investment" used up in the war is already gone, and the enemy will have to pay for new productive investment if he wants to get a return on it. Again the question is: leaving aside the inability of Japan to make a productive investment, if it could, could it really recover its losses in the war? Once again, no. Because the large-scale war will still be there in the future, Japan will still suffer losses every day. So long as widespread guerrilla warfare exists in the enemy's rear, such as the current guerrilla warfare in North China, it will be very difficult for Japan to recoup its losses. Because of the constant war, not only will it be unable to get any compensation for its previous losses, but in addition it will have to continue to pay for new losses. So long as we continue to pursue resolutely our War of Resistance, Japan's pitiful fate is largely assured. We say that, during the second strategic stage, that is, the stage of stalemate, Japan will gradually change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior. This continuous drain is one aspect of the situation which is already decided. Let us now talk about the Chinese side. In the final analysis, has China's strength increased or decreased? Our answer is that it has both decreased and increased. The reduction is in the quality and quantity of the original forces; it is shown in the drain of personnel and weapons in the military, the loss of population, industry, land, and natural resources. This is one important aspect that makes us feel difficulties. Nevertheless, it does not mean that there is no increase. The increase is in new quality and quantity and is manifested in the unity of the whole country, the progress of the military, the progress of politics, the progress of culture, and the increase in the degree of consciousness and organization of the people. Although the main forces have retreated, the guerrilla war is moving forward. Although some places have been lost, other places have made progress. The problem is that the level of increase today is far from adequate. Today it is not enough to stop the enemy's offensive, still less will it be sufficient to carry out our counteroffensive in the future. Consequently there has arisen the necessity of exerting widespread and protracted efforts to increase the new forces. What is more, this increase means the greater mobilization of the vital forces in all strata of the whole nation and greater progress in all aspects of the Party, the government, the army, and the people. This is entirely possible, relying

on broad and protracted efforts now and in the future. Relying mainly on the growing forces nurtured by ourselves, combined with the increase in the difficulties of the enemy and the enhancement of the international assistance to us, the overall situation between the enemy and ourselves will be changed from the present situation in which the enemy is superior and we are inferior, first to a balance between the enemy and ourselves, and then further to a situation in which we are superior and the enemy is inferior. This is a fundamental problem that must and can be resolved during the long period of stalemate.

14. The Enemy Occupies the Cities and We Occupy the Countryside, so the War Is Protracted, but in the End the Countryside Is Capable of Defeating the Cities

The question is as follows: now that the enemy has occupied China's principal cities and lines of communication, and bases himself on the cities to oppose us, while we base ourselves on the countryside to oppose the enemy, can the countryside defeat the cities? The answer is that it is difficult, but it can be done. The protracted character of the War of Resistance against Japan results not only from the fact that the enemy is an imperialist country, while we are a semicolonial country, but also from the fact that this imperialist country has occupied our cities, and we have to withdraw to the countryside to resist it. Consequently, the war has a protracted character. Here the theory of a quick victory is completely unfounded. At the same time, the problem of China's cities and countryside today is qualitatively different from that of the cities and the countryside in foreign capitalist countries. In capitalist countries, the cities rule the countryside in substance as well as in form, and once the head constituted by the cities is cut off, the four limbs of the countryside cannot continue to survive. It is impossible to conceive of a protracted peasant war in the countryside against the cities in countries such as Britain, America, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy. Such a thing is also impossible in a small semicolonial country. In a big semicolonial country like China, it would also have been very difficult several decades ago. Such a possibility has, however, now emerged in a big semicolonial country such as China, but very obviously three interrelated conditions are required. The first is that it should be a semicolonial country. In a semicolony, although the cities have a leadership function, they cannot rule the countryside completely, for the cities are too small and the countryside is too extensive, and the vast human and material resources are to be found in the countryside, rather than in the cities. The second condition is that it should be a big country. If you lose part of it, there is still another part remaining. The enemy is controlling a big country with few troops, and if you add to this our resolute resistance, the enemy is forced into a situation where he experiences the difficulties of having an insufficient military force and of having this force split up. Thus, not only do we get a main anti-Japanese base area, or a great rear area, including, for example, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, which the enemy cannot capture, but we also obtain large bases for guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear—for example,

North China, Central China, and South China—which the enemy is unable to occupy completely. The third condition is given by present circumstances. If China had been conquered militarily by a great imperialist country several decades ago, as England conquered India, we could scarcely have avoided losing our state (*wang guo*).⁸ But today things are different, mainly because China has progressed: there are new political parties, new armies, and new people, and this is the basic force for defeating the enemy. Less important is the retrogression of the enemy and the fact that the process of the social and economic development of Japanese imperialism has come to the brink of decline, and the development of Japanese capitalism has created and is still creating the conditions which will send it to the tomb. Still less important is the change in the international situation and the fact that the old world is on the brink of death, and the new world has seen the light of dawn. I have already explained these points in detail in *On Protracted War*. To sum up, in today's big semicolonial countries such as China, there exist many favorable conditions which will help us in organizing a resolute, prolonged, and widespread war of resistance against the enemy who has occupied our cities. If we wage war on many interlocking fronts, encircle the cities and isolate them, meanwhile gradually increasing our own strength over a long period, and so transform the relations between the enemy and ourselves; and if we coordinate these tactics with changes in the international situation—in this case, we will be able to drive out the enemy progressively and regain control of the cities. There is not the slightest doubt that it is difficult, even in China today, for the countryside to oppose the cities, because in general the cities are concentrated, whereas the countryside is scattered. Since the enemy occupied our big cities and important communication lines, our administrative areas and the battlefields have been separated territorially, and this has created many difficulties for us. This determines the protracted and bitter character of the War of Resistance against Japan. Nevertheless, we must state that the countryside can defeat the cities because of the existence of the above-mentioned three interrelated conditions. In the conditions prevailing during the civil war, a very small portion of the countryside carried on a protracted war against the cities, even at a time when all the imperialist countries together were opposing communism. Who would venture to say that under the conditions of the national war, and, moreover, at a time when the imperialist camp is divided, the greater part of the Chinese countryside cannot carry on a protracted war against the enemy in the cities? There is not the slightest doubt that this is possible. Moreover, there is a great difference between what we call the countryside today and the countryside at the time of the civil war. Not only is the area much greater, but we still possess, in the broad rear area made up of provinces such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, a number of

8. The threat of "losing one's state" (*wang guo*) and becoming "slaves without a country" had been eloquently denounced by Li Dazhao, one of the two principal founders of the Chinese Communist Party (see *Marxism and Asia*, pp. 206–8), and was often mentioned by Mao in the 1920s and 1930s.

cities and industrial enterprises, we still have contacts with foreign countries, and we can still engage in construction. Relying on the maintenance of the broad rear and the building of base areas for guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, nurturing our forces over the long term, and weakening the forces of the enemy, and, in addition, coordinating our actions with favorable future international conditions, we will be able to launch a counteroffensive and take back the cities. In his open letter to the citizens of last December, Chairman Chiang pointed out: "The heart of China's protracted war of resistance, the source of its ultimate victory, is to be found neither in Nanjing nor in any other big city, but lies in reality in the villages of the whole country and in the firmness of heart of the people." This is absolutely correct; although the war is difficult, a victorious future awaits us.

15. The Crisis of Compromise Exists in Grave Form, Yet It Can Be Overcome

We said a long time ago that some of the people who are affected by an irrational fear of Japan have been attempting all the time to shake the determination of the government in the War of Resistance and advocate so-called peaceful compromise. In the past, this tendency appeared after the fall of Nanjing, and now they are ready to start something again. This is a reflection of the enemy's conspiracy within the anti-Japanese front. This threat exists seriously, and our compatriots must pay full attention to it and not let the pro-Japanese faction take advantage of it to carry out their conspiracy. What the pro-Japanese elements are attempting and what the enemy is attempting is the same and is necessarily concentrated on opposition to Chiang and to the Communists. If they are allowed to take advantage and to carry out their conspiracy, the future of the Resistance War will be called into question. Therefore, the whole nation should be on guard against the enemy's conspiracy and the threat of sowing dissension among ourselves, automatically and consciously oppose this conspiracy, and not relax our vigilance for a moment. Can this crisis be overcome? Yes, it can. After the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and all the patriots have united as one, made the necessary efforts, overcome the danger of compromise, expelled the demons and ghosts who are helping the enemy, and resolutely pursued the War of Resistance, this is not only absolutely necessary, but absolutely possible as well. Because in the final analysis, the pro-Japanese faction does not have a great deal of strength, and the strength of the anti-Japanese faction is greater than that of the pro-Japanese faction.

16. The New Situation of Guerrilla Warfare During the Stage of Stalemate

During the new stage, while the main forces are defending the front, guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear will temporarily become the major form. Yet the guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear during the new stage of stalemate between ourselves

and the enemy will be developing in a new form. Then what is the new form of guerrilla warfare? First, it will still develop extensively in vast areas. This is because we have a great deal of territory, and as regards the enemy, his troops are insufficient and dispersed. So long as we can persist in the orientation of developing guerrilla warfare and guide it correctly, it is impossible for the enemy to restrict our development fundamentally. But, second, in some of the important strategic regions, for example, in North China and the lower reaches of the Yangzi, we will meet with a savage offensive from the enemy, and it will be very difficult for us to maintain large bodies of troops in the plains. Accordingly, the hilly regions will become our major base areas, and the guerrilla troops in some regions will have to reduce their numbers temporarily. We should begin to prepare now for the arrival of this situation. At the moment, in order to support the fighting of the main forces at the front, and prepare for the transition to the new stage, we should divide the guerrilla warfare generally into two regions. One is the region in which the guerrilla warfare has been fully developed, as in North China, where the major orientation is to consolidate the foundations that have already been built to get ready to defeat the enemy's cruel attack in the new stage and sustain the base area. The other is the region in which guerrilla warfare has not yet been fully developed or is just beginning to develop, for example, in Central China, where the major orientation is to develop guerrilla warfare as quickly as possible to avoid the difficulty in developing guerrilla warfare after the enemy swings back. In the future, in order to coordinate with the defense at the front, and to give the main forces a chance for rest and reorganization, in order to nurture our forces and prepare for the strategic counteroffensive, we must try our best to sustain the guerrilla warfare to defend the base areas. During the long period of holding out, train our guerrilla troops into an active and strong army, pin down the enemy, and help the battle at the front. Generally speaking, the guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear in the new stage will be much more difficult compared with the previous period. We must first see this difficulty, admit this difficulty, and never lose our heads because of the easy development in the previous period, since the enemy will surely turn back to attack the guerrilla forces. It can, however, be sustained. Every leader working in the enemy's rear must have such self-confidence, because the condition of guerrilla warfare in a national war, no matter how strong the enemy is, is far better than that during the civil war. Here, winning over and disintegrating the puppet troops to isolate the Japanese bandits is a very important task.

17. The New Stage in the Development of the War of Resistance Against Japan Is at the Same Time the New Stage in the Development of the Anti-Japanese National United Front

The above remarks have been devoted entirely to the problem of the form of the War of Resistance against Japan. In what follows I am going to talk about the situation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

The time when the War of Resistance against Japan has developed to a new stage is simultaneously the time when the Anti-Japanese National United Front has developed to a new stage. Because more difficulties will be encountered in the new stage than before, the Anti-Japanese National United Front should also adapt to accommodate this situation and show its great strength in fighting against all difficulties and defeating them. So that, during the present transitional period and in the new stage in the future, the Chinese national united front does not show its inability to deal with difficulties but shows, instead, its great power in overcoming difficulties, we must earnestly consolidate as well as enlarge the united front. A protracted war can be sustained only with a lasting united front; the protracted character of the war and that of the united front can never be separated.

18. The Guomindang Has a Bright Future

The Guomindang and the Communist Party are the foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, but of these two it is the Guomindang that is the first great party. Without the Guomindang, it would have been inconceivable to launch and sustain the War of Resistance. The Guomindang has its own glorious history, of which the main achievements are the overthrow of the Qing; the establishment of the Republic; opposition to Yuan Shikai; the establishment of the Three Policies of uniting with Russia, with the Communist Party, and with the workers and peasants; and carrying out the great revolution of 1926–1927. Today it is once more leading the great War of Resistance against Japan. It enjoys the historic heritage of the Three People's Principles; it has had two great leaders in succession—Mr. Sun Yatsen and Mr. Chiang Kaishek; and it has a great number of loyal and patriotic party members. All this should not be underestimated by our compatriots and constitutes the result of China's historical development.

In the conduct of the War of Resistance against Japan and the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Guomindang occupies the position of leader and backbone. During the past fifteen months all the anti-Japanese parties in the nation have made progress, and the progress of the Guomindang is also outstanding. It called together the Provisional Representative Assembly,⁹ issued the Program for the War of Resistance and Building the Country,¹⁰ summoned the People's Political Consultative Conference, began to organize the Three People's Principles Youth League, recognized the legitimate existence of all parties and factions, and their joint [participation in] resisting the Japanese and building the country, instituted democratic rights to a certain extent, carried out some reforms in military affairs and in the political institutions, adapted foreign policy to meet the demands of the War of Resistance against Japan, and so on. These are all major

9. The reference is presumably to the gathering of over four hundred leading figures at a conference at Lushan summoned by Chiang Kaishek in the spring of 1937.

10. Cited above by Mao in section II.4.

events with historical significance. Provided only that it acts in accordance with the great premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, one can foresee a bright future for the Guomindang.

Until the present, however, many people still have an incorrect perception of the Guomindang. They are suspicious of the future of the Guomindang. The issues which arouse their suspicion of the Guomindang are whether it can continue the War of Resistance, whether it can continue to progress, and whether it can become a national union in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the country. These three questions are closely linked and cannot be separated. Then what are our views? We think that the Guomindang has a bright future. On the basis of all the subjective and objective conditions, it can continue the War of Resistance, continue to progress, and become a national union in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the country.

The political orientation of all China and of the Guomindang has basically been determined by the firmness of the enemy's offense, the serious blows and looting inflicted by the enemy on every stratum in China, the anger of armies throughout the country against the enemy and their courage in the War of Resistance, the upsurge of the anti-Japanese movement of the people in the whole country, the existence of a favorable international situation, and other facts. First, any party or faction, including the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the other anti-Japanese political parties and groups, cannot do otherwise than to continue the War of Resistance. Whoever does not pursue the War of Resistance will have one way out—to become a Chinese traitor. There is no other way out but this. Second, any party or faction, so long as it continues the War of Resistance, must continue to make progress. It is true that political progress in our country is neither rapid nor universal, and as a result we have suffered losses in the war. On the other hand, precisely because of the losses we have suffered, we cannot do otherwise than seek progress in politics, military affairs, culture, Party affairs, people's movements, and every other domain in the future, so that we can resist the enemy and regain the lost territory. Whether it be the ruling party, the Guomindang, or any other party or faction, they will all have to continue to make progress. Third, one of the important links in progress within the country is the democratization of the organizational form of the Guomindang, in order that it may itself be transformed into a national alliance for resisting Japan and building the country, and the best organizational form for the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Does this possibility exist? I think it does. Given the general trend of the War of Resistance against Japan, if the Guomindang refuses to open its doors to the broad popular masses, and to accept all the patriotic parties and factions, as well as the patriotic individuals, in a great organization, it will be impossible for it to fulfill the difficult task of continuing the War of Resistance and defeating the enemy. In its history of more than fifty years, whenever the Guomindang has encountered a great revolutionary struggle, it has always changed itself into a revolutionary national union. Two instances of this are the most striking and the most endowed

with historical significance. In the first instance, from the founding of the Tongmenghui to the 1911 Revolution for the purpose of opposing the Qing dynasty and setting up a republic, Mr. Sun Yatsen united all the anti-Manchu revolutionary parties and factions (from the Restoration Society to the Gelaohui [Elder Brother Society]). During this period its party members accomplished many heroic deeds; they worked ceaselessly and unremittingly and were full of vigor, and as a result they were successful in the 1911 Revolution. The second time, from 1924 to 1927, for the purpose of opposing the imperialists and the warlords, they united with the workers and the Communist Party within the country, and with the socialist Soviet Union abroad, established the well-known "Three Great Policies." As a result they founded the Huangpu Academy, established the party's army, and achieved victory in the Northern Expedition. All of these things manifested not only the development of the united front policy of the Guomindang but the development of the Three People's Principles. Today is the third historical opportunity for the Guomindang to become a revolutionary national union, in order to fight against Japanese imperialism and establish a republic of the Three People's Principles. It can and must change itself into a national alliance to resist Japan and build the country. This great movement is already beginning. [The Guomindang] has recognized the legal existence of the Communist Party and the other parties and factions, admitting the Eighth Route Army to the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army, and proclaimed explicitly in the program for resisting Japan and building the country: "In striving for victory in the War of Resistance and success in building the country, it is true that we must rely on the efforts of our party members, but we must particularly rely on the hard work and unanimous sharing of the burden by all the people of the nation." These facts, in addition to the convocation of the People's Political Consultative Conference and the organization of the Three People's Principles Youth League, have all shown the beginning of its efforts in turning itself into a national alliance in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the country. The question now is: what attitude should the Communist Party adopt toward this movement of the Guomindang to enlarge its organization? Should we approve or disapprove? We say that at any time we will support the Guomindang in expanding and developing itself into a revolutionary national alliance. In 1924, when the Guomindang was reorganizing, we adopted a policy of support. Today, when the national crisis is far more serious, we will do all we can to assist them. The reason is that the larger the friendly armies resisting Japan, the better, for the development and progress of the Communist Party alone is insufficient to repel Japanese imperialism. Although the Communist Party, which is in the position of the number-two party, has launched and persisted in the united front of all parties and armies, and has in addition opened its doors wide to all the revolutionary comrades, in order that all may strive to win victory in the anti-Japanese war, if the Guomindang, which occupies the position of the number-one party, remained in its old state as in the past, it would be extremely harmful to the War of Resistance and to the united

front. We would not be able to win victory in the War of Resistance, the whole nation would be in danger, and the Communist Party and the proletariat would not be able to escape this danger either. Consequently, the Communist Party not only will not oppose but places strong hopes in and resolutely assists the efforts of the Guomindang to enlarge and consolidate its organization, carry out inner-Party democracy, and change itself into a revolutionary national alliance, in order to benefit the continuation of the War of Resistance, and gain final victory.

19. Yet There Are Still Obstacles in the Future Prospects of the Guomindang, and They Must Work Hard to Overcome Them Before Any Progress Can Be Made

The bright future of the Guomindang exists, and its progress and development are possible. Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the majority of the Guomindang are leading the Guomindang and pushing it forward. As everyone knows, however, there are still a few conservative elements in the Guomindang who are obstructing the speed and extent of the progress of their party. Because of the existence of these elements, and their collusion with many conservative elements in society, they have created a countercurrent in the mainstream of the national-revolutionary war and are stubbornly resisting the vessel of progress, forcefully obstructing the democratization of the country, obstructing the carrying out of all the necessary progressive causes of the War of Resistance, obstructing the carrying out of many of the very good orientations and methods proposed by Mr. Chiang Kaishek in his past declarations, talks, speeches, and orders, obstructing the application of the Guomindang's program for the War of Resistance and building the nation, obstructing the application of the laws and decrees of the National Government, and obstructing the development of the movements of the popular masses. These are all facts and are all major reasons why the progress of the Guomindang is neither rapid nor universal and why the War of Resistance has met with so many disadvantages. They are opposed to the progress and development of the Guomindang, and even advocate compromise. If these elements get the upper hand, the cause of national liberation in China will suffer a very great setback. Thus we must pay serious attention to the matter. Nonetheless, we firmly believe that this conservative force cannot persist forever, that it has not obtained and is unlikely to obtain the upper hand. Such people are a countercurrent and by no means the main stream. Under the leadership of Chairman Chiang, with the efforts of the majority of the Guomindang and the support of all the people of the country, this conservative tendency can be overcome. The Communist Party resolutely supports the progress of the Guomindang, and, as far as the conservative elements obstructing progress are concerned, we hope that they will turn over a new leaf and make progress together with us. We hope these people will change. "The faults of the superior man are like the eclipses of the sun and the moon"; when they have changed back,

all will be well.¹¹ Actually we have seen many conservative elements making progress in the process of the War of Resistance. In the future there are sure to be many more people awakened by the lessons of the War of Resistance and making progress together with the broad masses. This is the character of being able to change of the conservative elements in the War of Resistance against Japan. But there might also be a few people who will become even worse and are willing to be washed away by the gigantic waves of the War of Resistance. This is another aspect of their changeable nature. Toward people of this kind, we should show no pity at all.

20. The Other Parties and Factions Also Have a Bright Future

Under the general premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, all those parties and factions that have joined the Anti-Japanese National United Front have a future of further development. We are willing to establish lasting cooperation with all of them and to help them as much as possible. This applies equally to the Third Party, the National Youth Party, the National Social Party, the National Salvation Association, and any other groups, parties, and factions. Clearly, when we say that, under the general premise of persistence in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, all parties will have a bright future, this includes efforts to overcome the conservative tendency in every party. If there exists a conservative tendency which will harm the War of Resistance and the united front, and it is allowed to develop, that will present a danger that we might forfeit our bright future. This applies in the same way to the Guomindang, the Communist Party, or any other party; we must all pay full attention to it.

21. The Characteristics of China's Anti-Japanese National United Front

For reasons rooted in Chinese history, today's Anti-Japanese National United Front in China is different from any of the united fronts in foreign countries, such as the Popular Front. Nor is it the same as the united front in Chinese history, such as the First United Front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. It has the characteristics of today's China. To understand these characteristics is of the very

11. The quotation is from the Confucian *Analects*, Book XIX, Chapter XXI (Legge, Vol. I, p. 346). In the clause which follows, Mao summarizes the sense of the second sentence in the original, which continues, "He has his faults, and all men see them; he changes again, and all men look up to him." Mao made use of the same passage from the *Analects* in a speech of 1959 after the Lushan Plenum, to illustrate the point that all men make mistakes, but these can be corrected. See S. Schram (ed.), *Chairman Mao Talks to the People* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), pp. 153-54.

greatest significance as regards consolidating and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

What, then, are these characteristics? To sum up, there are eight in all, namely: the entire nation is resisting Japan; the long-term nature [of the united front]; [its] imbalance; the existence of armies; fifteen years of experience; the fact that the majority of the popular masses are still not organized; the Three People's Principles; and new international circumstances.

First of all, there is the fact that the entire nation is resisting Japan. This characteristic determines the basic nature of our united front. On the one hand, the objective for which our united front was established and developed is to fight the invasion of our national territory by an alien race, Japanese imperialism. On the other hand, our united front is a vast organization comprising all the different parties and factions, all the different classes, all the different armies, and all the different nationalities making up our nation. It is because it is directed against invasion by an alien race that the components of this organization could be so extensive. Because the composition of this organization is so extremely broad, it has great strength; but at the same time there is inevitably considerable friction between participants in this united front, and this must be properly adjusted before the goal of uniting against the foreigners can be achieved. These most fundamental characteristics of our united front—resistance to invasion by an alien race as the political purpose and the extremely large size of the components of the organization—are different from the popular front in France and Spain, nor were they to be found during the national front during the first great revolution (the cooperation at that time between the Guomindang and the Communist Party). As a result, today's united front has developed many special contents and results. This is the first characteristic and strong point of today's united front, although at the same time, its complex organization inevitably embodies some defects.

The second characteristic is its long-term nature. This results from the first characteristic. Since this united front makes use of national war to fight against Japanese imperialism, and since Japanese imperialism is a strong imperialism, this gives rise to the long-term character of the War of Resistance against Japan and also to the long-term character of the united front. I will deal further with this in section V of my report, for it is the point of departure for all our policies. This point, too, differs from the first period of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party.

The third characteristic is imbalance. For historical reasons, there is an imbalance of political power between all the parties and factions and between all the classes and strata. At the same time, this imbalance is reflected in the distribution of regions. The Guomindang is the first big party that has real strength; the Communist Party comes second, and the other parties follow. This phenomenon has resulted in many special things.

The fourth characteristic is that there are armies. Both the Guomindang and the Communist Party have armies—this is the result of the special historical conditions, and it is not a defect but an advantage. The fact that the two parties have

armies creates the best possible basis for the two parties to fulfill their responsibilities of division of labor and cooperation in the course of the anti-Japanese war, and there will also be more benefits in observing and emulating one another's work. This point is similar to [the situation in] Spain, but different from [that in] France, nor is it the same as in the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. It is also one of the factors that make possible long-term cooperation between the two parties.

The fifth characteristic is the fifteen years of experience. The conclusion from the four years of the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist party from 1924 to 1927, the nine-year split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party from 1927 to 1936, and now the renewed cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, from these fifteen years of experience of cooperation, split, and then again cooperation, has taught a profound lesson to both the Guomindang and the Communist Party, to the other parties and factions, and to the people of the whole country. The conclusion is: they should only cooperate, and not split. This is also one of the foundations for long-term cooperation. No other country in the world has had this kind of valuable experience, nor did we have it during the first period of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party.

The sixth characteristic is that the majority of the popular masses are not yet organized. This is a Chinese peculiarity; the various countries in the West are not like this. It is a defect, because as a result the united front lacks an already existing organized mass foundation. But at the same time, all the parties can, on the basis of a division of labor, set out to organize the popular masses. They should not always crowd together and create friction, for some of the as-yet unorganized popular masses are just waiting to be organized to meet the urgent demands of the War of Resistance.

The seventh characteristic is the Three People's Principles. The Three People's Principles are the political foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. They are the basis, not only for cooperation against Japan but also for cooperation to build the country. The nationalism of the Three People's Principles will lead this cooperation to strive for the liberation of the whole nation; their People's Rights will lead this cooperation to the establishment of a thoroughly democratic country; their people's livelihood is even more capable of leading this cooperation for a very long time. The political program and political thought of the Three People's Principles guarantee the lasting character of the united front.

The eighth characteristic is to be found in new international circumstances. The political and economic conditions in the world today are different from those in the first period of cooperation and in the period of civil war between the two parties. Today only some imperialist countries, such as Japan, Germany, and Italy, are against the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The other imperialist countries, because of the contradictions between them and Japan, are not at all opposed to our united front at present but, on the contrary, adopt an attitude of help and support.

All the progressive people in every country support and assist us, and the Soviet Union supports and assists us even more sincerely. This kind of new international environment has a great impact upon our long-term cooperation.

Only if we profoundly study and understand the above-mentioned characteristics can we adopt a proper attitude in politics, in policy, and in our work. We should not deal with political problems and problems in our work by treating the head when the head aches and treating the foot when the foot hurts. Instead we should solve the problems correctly on a scientific basis. Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, and the strengthening and enlargement of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, requires this kind of scientific foundation.

22. *The New Situation of the United Front*

In the new period of the War of Resistance against Japan the Anti-Japanese National United Front must appear with a new look in order to deal with the new prospect of the war. This new look refers to the extensive development and high degree of consolidation of the united front. The lessons of uniting for the War of Resistance in the past fifteen months will make every party understand the necessity of this kind of development and consolidation. As regards development, it is to enlarge the organizations of all the parties and of the popular masses. As regards consolidation, it means that every party adopts new policies and new work to reduce the friction between one another, to achieve true and sincere unity, and to go together to the aid of the country. There are many difficulties in the new period of the Resistance War. Only if every party in the united front enlarges and develops its organization, and consolidates to a high degree its internal relationships as well as the relationships between different parties, will it be possible to carry out new political tasks, overcome new difficulties, and achieve the goal of stopping the enemy's offensive and preparing for our counteroffensive. This is the new situation of the united front in the new situation of the War of Resistance against Japan. Thanks to the joint efforts of every party, and the ardent support of the people of the whole country, it is absolutely possible that such a new situation will arise.

IV. *The Current Urgent Task of the Whole Nation*

According to the summary of the War of Resistance in the past and the predictions regarding the current War of Resistance and the new stage in the development of the united front, what should the current urgent tasks facing the whole nation be? How should they differ from those in the past?

The general tasks should be: persist in the War of Resistance and in the protracted war, consolidate and enlarge the united front in order to overcome the difficulties, stop the enemy's offensive, prepare forces, carry out our counteroffensive, and achieve our goal of ultimately driving the enemy out of our country.

To take them separately, there are the following concrete tasks. Every component in the organization of the Anti-Japanese National United Front should support the government, and, moreover, under the leadership of the government, mobilize the entire nation to carry them out. Communist Party members should become models in carrying out these tasks.

1. Highly Encourage National Self-Esteem and Self-Confidence, Persist in the Resistance War to the Very End. Overcome Pessimistic Sentiments, Oppose the Attempt at Compromise

We reckon that, under the new situation in the War of Resistance, there must be some people among whom, because of the losses of major big cities and communication lines, the financial and economic difficulties, and the delay in receiving international assistance, there arises and grows a pessimistic sentiment regarding the future of the War of Resistance. What is more, the Japanese bandits, Chinese traitors, and pro-Japanese elements will surely take advantage of this sentiment and spread the atmosphere of peace and compromise, attempting to shake our determination to resist. Therefore, the first task of the whole nation is to display national dignity and national self-confidence to a high degree, overcome the pessimistic sentiment among some of the people, resolutely support the government's policy of continuing the War of Resistance, oppose any attempts at surrender and compromise, and persist in the Resistance War to the very end. This task is more important than in any of the past periods.

For this aim, we must mobilize the newspapers, magazines, schools, propaganda organs, cultural and artistic societies, the political organs in the military, the popular masses, and all other possible forces to carry out extensive propaganda and agitation among the officers and soldiers at the front, the service troops in the rear, the people in the occupied territories, and the popular masses in the whole nation. We must firmly carry out this policy as planned, advocate a War of Resistance to the very end, oppose surrender and compromise, clean up pessimistic sentiments, repeatedly point out the possibility and certainty of a final victory, point out clearly that compromise means subjugation, but resistance is our only way out, and call on the entire nation to unite together, fearing neither difficulties nor death. We are determined to achieve freedom, we are determined to win victory, to achieve the objective of the pursuit of the War of Resistance by the whole nation, united as one.

For this purpose all the propaganda and agitation should deal with the following aspects. On the one hand, use the models already created and being created in the national revolution (heroic resistance, laying down one's life for the nation, [the Battle of] Pingxingguan, the Battle of Tai'erzhuang, the eight hundred brave soldiers, the progress of guerrilla warfare, generous donations, patriotism of the overseas Chinese, etc.), and make them known far and wide to the front and the

rear region, within the country and abroad. On the other, expose, clean up, and eliminate the negative characteristics which exist and grow within the national front (compromising tendencies, pessimistic sentiments, the phenomenon of corruption, etc.). On yet another hand, make public to the whole nation the specific examples of all the enemy's cruel and brutal behavior, denounce them to the whole world, to achieve the objective of raising the national consciousness and carrying forward national dignity and confidence. We must be aware that the deficiency of this kind of consciousness and self-confidence will greatly affect the primary task of overcoming the difficulties and preparing for a counteroffensive.

2. Support Chairman Chiang, Support the National Government, Support Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, Oppose Discord and Splits, Oppose Any Government of Chinese Traitors

In the new environment, the enemy's policy is sure to concentrate on opposing Chiang and opposing communism, setting up a nationwide government of Chinese traitors, attempting to overthrow Chairman Chiang and the National Government, and sabotaging the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and national unity. To counter this policy of the enemy, the second task of the entire nation is to call on the whole country unanimously and truly to support Chairman Chiang, support the National Government, support the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, support national unity, oppose any of the deeds of the enemy that will hurt Chairman Chiang, the National Government, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, or national unity. Oppose the rule of China by any government of Chinese traitors.

For this purpose, we must adjust the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, adjust the relationship between the center and the localities, adjust the relationships between different armies in the War of Resistance, and adjust the relationship between the government and the people. Among these relationships, we should encourage the spirit of justice and fair and mutual assistance and love, reduce friction and the phenomenon of disagreements, oppose the behavior of using difficulties to make trouble for the government. Call on the whole nation to pay serious attention to the instigation of discord among us by the enemy, Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements, and their plots and conspiracy to create complaints and disagreements and to encourage friction among us. We must make sure that the prestige of Chairman Chiang and the National Government is not affected, make sure that the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and the unity of the entire country become closer day by day, set up a firm and strong center that will continue the resistance in a difficult environment to confront the enemy and the government of Chinese traitors, overcome difficulties, and prepare for the counteroffensive.

3. Increase the Fighting Capacity of the Main Forces, Defend Central China, South China, and the Northwest, and Stop the Enemy's Offensive

In order to counter the enemy's current attack on Wuhan and his attempt to continue to attack South China and the Northwest, the third task of the whole nation is to raise the fighting capacity of the main forces, reorganize the troops we now have, organize and add new troops, fight for the purpose of defending Central China, South China, and the Northwest, and stop the enemy's offensive. To achieve this goal, as regards China's main forces, they must first develop mobile warfare accompanied by necessary and possible positional defense, resist the enemy bit by bit, and drain the enemy's strength. Second, we must set up possible military factories in the rear area, and also increase our manufacturing capacity, to provide the front with weapons and ammunition. Third, we must conscientiously carry out in the military the political work of the national revolution, carry out education in politics, culture, and entertainment, and raise the brave and enduring fighting spirit of the whole army. Fourth, improve the lives of the soldiers on the basis of the present material conditions, set up economic committees in the companies, and let the soldiers manage the mess. Fifth, encourage self-discipline, eliminate the system of beating and cursing, and encourage friendship and unity between the officers and the soldiers to improve relations between the officers and the soldiers. Sixth, carry out fair trade, treat people politely, do not collect grain by force, do not force people to become porters or soldiers; instead, use the method of political mobilization to solve the problems of grain, porters, and new recruits, in order to improve relations between the army and the people. Seventh, between the different armies at the front, between the different armies at the front and in the rear, we should enhance the spirit of friendship and mutual assistance, help and collaborate with one another in wartime, inspect and learn from one another at work, eliminate such bad phenomena as looking on at one another and envying one another, in order to improve relations among different armies. Eighth, reorganize the troops we have now, reinforce them where there are vacancies; meanwhile, organize and add new troops and speed up education and training to help in the protracted war. Use all these methods to raise the fighting capacity of the principal forces, to fight for the defense of Central China, South China, and the Northwest, and to strive to stop the enemy's offensive and prepare for our counteroffensive.

4. Develop the Guerrilla Warfare Extensively in the Enemy's Rear, Establish and Consolidate Our Base Areas, Reduce the Enemy's Base Areas, and Cooperate in the Fighting of the Main Forces

In the light of the fact that the enemy's goal is to continue to attack us, while at certain times it will divert some of its troops to launch guerrilla attacks in an attempt

to strengthen its occupied territory, and make the Chinese counteroffensive very difficult, the fourth task of the whole nation is to develop guerrilla warfare in a broad area in the enemy's rear, to establish many base areas, and consolidate the existing bases; use them to restrict the area occupied by the enemy; at present, to fight together with the main forces to halt the enemy's advance, and in the future to fight to carry out the counteroffensive in coordination with the main forces. One of the important characteristics of the national War of Resistance against Japan in semicolonial China is the popularity and protractedness of guerrilla warfare. Without this kind of guerrilla warfare, we will not be able to pin down large numbers of the enemy's troops and forcefully assist the fighting of the main forces at the front to stop the enemy's offensive, nor will we be able to restrict the enemy's occupied territory within a certain region so that it cannot occupy the entire area completely. We will not be able to set up many anti-Japanese strongholds in the enemy's rear, persist in guerrilla warfare, and further cooperate with the counteroffensive of the main forces in the future. Hence, we must first develop guerrilla warfare broadly in all the areas in the enemy's rear, set up many base areas for guerrilla warfare, and strengthen those that have already been set up. Second, we must learn from the example in North China and leave behind or send enough regular troops to every strategic region in the enemy's rear, and use them as the backbone in sustaining long-term guerrilla warfare. These troops should gradually master the tactics of guerrilla warfare, strengthen the political work, develop the movements of the popular masses, and establish base areas. Furthermore, they should help the popular masses and guerrillas in the enemy's rear and gradually raise them to the path of the regular army and regular warfare. Third, every war zone and every rear area of the enemy must mobilize all the men and women and their enthusiasm in defending the nation and their native *xian*. Apart from mobilizing them in large numbers to join the guerrillas not participating in production, and to serve as reinforcements for the regular army units left behind in the enemy's rear, we should organize them into semimilitary people's anti-Japanese self-defense units. The people's anti-Japanese self-defense units should become the universal and regular militia system in every war zone and in the enemy's rear area. They are not withdrawn from production. Fourth, we must help the people to organize large numbers of guerrillas. These are withdrawn from production. Every *xian* and every district should have them, and they will become widespread small armies that make surprise attacks on the enemy and defend the locality. Fifth, we must set up political work in the guerrilla units and strengthen their political, cultural, and entertainment education to increase their fighting capacity. Sixth, we must set up correct military and political systems in the guerrilla units, carry out the policy of equal treatment for officers and soldiers, and of economic openness. Seventh, reform the bandit troops and let them join the anti-Japanese war; eliminate the bandits in the rear of our armies which are being used by the enemy. Eighth, the supply of arms and ammunition in the guerrilla war is a very important problem. On the one hand, in the great rear area we must try our best

to help [the guerrillas]; on the other hand, every base area for guerrilla warfare must try by every possible means to set up small military factories, to the point that they can make their own ammunition, rifles, and hand grenades, so that guerrilla warfare need not worry about the lack of arms and ammunition. Ninth, on the basis of the enemy's situation and our strategic requirements, divide up once again the war districts and political districts in the enemy's rear, so that they will suit the new war situations. Tenth, on the basis of the strategic requirements, we must unify the leadership of the various units and administrative areas in the enemy's rear, in order to concentrate the forces resisting the enemy, and eliminate internal contradictions; but at the same time, we should oppose the warlord behavior of mutual annexation.

5. Raise the Level of Military Technology, Set Up a Mechanized Corps, and Prepare Strength for the Counteroffensive

The main reason the enemy could gradually enter deep into our country with an army smaller than ours, apart from political causes on our side, is our technological backwardness. In light of the enemy's strength and our weakness [in this domain], the fifth task of the whole nation is to raise the level of our military technology, increase the number of planes, cannons, tanks, and so on, and the number of persons trained to use them, in order to prepare strength for the counteroffensive. For this purpose, we should, on the one hand, start this work now, using the productive capacity that we have now, and which we can increase in the future, beginning with partial manufacture and repairs, and doing this work conscientiously. On the other hand, try by every possible means to import weapons of a new type from foreign countries and to use them to improve gradually the equipment of the army and set up a real modern mechanized corps. Without any doubt, we should look at the problem from a realistic point of view. At present, the weapons that are actually in use are large numbers of primitive weapons. Consequently, we should call on all the troops and the armed people in the country to believe that primitive weapons can also defeat the enemy, enhance their political spirit, improve their tactics, and develop guerrilla warfare to compensate for the lack of new technology. If we do not work especially hard on this aspect, we will be neglecting the practical problem at present and will not be able to overcome the current difficulties. In the future, in preparing for the strategic counteroffensive, this cannot be done unless we raise the new technology and build new-type armies. We should be aware that, without a sufficient number of troops equipped with modern new technology, it is impossible to carry out the counteroffensive and regain our lost territory. Moreover, if we do not draw attention to this point and begin applying it seriously on a feasible scale, we will see only the present and forget the future, and will not be able to overcome the difficulties on our way to the future. In a country like China that is rich in manpower and material resources, provided only that the political conditions are improved,

and the method of mobilization is progressive, and there is help from foreign countries, it is never impossible to improve technological equipment gradually.

6. Carry Out Democratic Politics Under Centralized Leadership, Establish Close Relations Between the Government and the People, and Bring into Full Play the Utmost Capacity of the Anti-Japanese Political Régime

The enemy is taking advantage of our weakness, not only in military matters but also in the political domain; it is taking advantage of the fact that our political system has not been democratized, so that it cannot establish close links with the broad masses of the people. In order to remedy this weakness, the sixth task of the whole nation is to establish a democratic system under centralized leadership. If there is no progress in this respect, it will be impossible ultimately to achieve final victory over the Japanese bandits. Democratic politics is the locomotive that mobilizes all the vital forces of the nation. With this system, the enthusiasm of the people throughout the country for resisting Japan will be mobilized to an incalculable extent and will become an inexhaustible source of power. The completion of the great process of thorough unification and unity of our whole nation can take place only on the basis of the establishment of a democratic system. As regards this point, we should have plans based on the reality in every field. First, the meeting of the People's Political Council has already taken the first step toward democratization of the state. Afterward, we should guarantee that the work of this council will proceed openly and smoothly, and that all its resolutions and decisions will be carried out. In addition, on the basis of the scheme already approved by this council, we should conscientiously set up local political councils in every province and at all levels, to push forward democratic politics. Second, guarantee the full implementation of the people's freedom of speech, freedom of publication, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of belief which are laid down in the Guiding Principles for the War of Resistance and Building the Country. This kind of freedom is within the sphere of the War of Resistance and Building the Country. Only if we fully guarantee this freedom will it contribute to bringing into play universally the forces for resisting Japan and building the country. The problem here is to assure the application of the laws and decrees of the central government in every locality without any arbitrary restrictions by the locality. The freedoms that should be restricted are only those which will harm the War of Resistance against Japan and the building of the country, for example, the freedom of the Chinese traitors and the pro-Japanese elements. The freedom of all others should not be restricted. Third, put into effect as many democratic systems as possible from the war zones and the enemy's rear. For instance, popularly elect the local governments at all levels before the appointment by the higher levels. Governments at every level in the war zones adopt the democratic centralized committee system. In addition, we should set up people's representative organs at all levels.

The governments in the war zone can add some necessary departments; change the form of government documents; eliminate embezzlers, the corrupt, and the incompetent; recruit activists in the War of Resistance against Japan; and reduce salaries and encourage simple livelihood, in order to adapt ourselves to the difficult, complex, and fluid environment in the war districts. Under the unified leadership of the central government, the local governments in the war zones have the right to issue special laws that apply only to the particular locality. All the male and female citizens in the war zones except the Chinese traitors have the right to vote and to be elected. They all have freedom of speech, freedom of publication, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of armed resistance to Japan. All the anti-Japanese parties and factions in the war zones have open and legal status, and so on. In the war zones, especially in the enemy's rear, it is impossible to sustain the long and bitter War of Resistance against Japan without these political reforms. All the above methods are for the purpose of linking the government intimately with the people and increasing the strength of the government, so that it can play the greatest possible role in the War of Resistance against Japan. Without a doubt, all local governments in the country should be under the leadership of the central government. They should not show any sign of disrespect toward the central government because of the geographic separation of the administrative area by the enemy. The entire nation should carry out the democratic system according to the laws of the central government, and at the same time the entire nation should be unified around the central government.

7. Enlarge the Unified Movement of the Popular Masses, Make Every Effort to Assist the War

The seventh task of the whole nation is to enlarge all kinds of movements of the popular masses, unify them, and make every effort to assist the war. Everything in this long and difficult War of Resistance against Japan comes from the popular masses. Without a widely developed united nationwide movement of the popular masses, it is impossible to sustain the war for a long period. This is especially the case in the war zones and in the enemy's rear. Just now, the War of Resistance against Japan is meeting with new difficulties, and only by mobilizing the popular masses can we overcome these difficulties. In the whole country, particularly in the war zones and in the enemy's rear, we should speedily do the following. One, guarantee the freedom of all anti-Japanese organizations and movements of the popular masses, establish the legal position of movements of the popular masses. Two, give material help to the organizations of the popular masses, and respect their independence. Three, set up earnestly all kinds of national salvation leagues of workers, peasants, young people, women, merchants, professionals, intellectuals, and children which are participated in by the broad masses. Moreover, on the basis of region and profession, let them establish unified organizations. Four, mobilize the popular masses and let them take part actively all kinds of work in the

War of Resistance, actively assisting the government and the army. This is particularly urgent and cannot be delayed in the war zones.

8. Improve the Livelihood of the People, Stimulate the Enthusiasm of the People in the Resistance War and Production

In the past we were very weak in dealing with the problem of improving the livelihood of the popular masses, and consequently we were unable to stimulate the enthusiasm of the broad masses of the toiling people for the Resistance War and for production. This was extremely disadvantageous to perseverance in a protracted war. Therefore, in the future, the eighth task of the whole nation is to carry out the following policies, which are intended to improve the livelihood of the popular masses. First, give preferential treatment to the family members of the anti-Japanese soldiers and the disabled anti-Japanese soldiers. Second, assist the refugees from natural disaster and war, and the unemployed workers in the war zones. Third, start an appropriate campaign to reduce rent and interest in the war zones and in the enemy's rear. Fourth, redistribute grain and important daily necessities. Fifth, make an appropriate increase in wages, and improve the benefits of the workers and employees. Sixth, admit the right of the workers and peasants to collective contracts with their employers and landlords. Seventh, stop the abuse, beating, and cursing of the workers and apprentices by the employers, landlords, masters, and overseers. These preliminary improvements in their lives should definitely increase the support of the poor workers and peasants for the government and their enthusiasm for joining the war and for taking part in production. Not only will the mobilization and support for the war be greatly improved, but the quantity and quality of the industrial and agricultural production and the circulation of commerce will be greatly increased and raised, and the national financial budget will be satisfactorily resolved on the new agricultural, industrial, and commercial foundations.

9. Carry Out the New Wartime Financial and Economic Policies, Tide Over the Difficulty in the War

After the fall of the major big cities and lines of communication, there will necessarily be great difficulties for the national finances and economy. Without new and effective methods, we cannot pull through this difficult moment in the war. Nevertheless, provided that we carry out the new policy, and mobilize the strength of the people, we will be able to overcome any difficulties. Accordingly, the ninth task facing the whole nation is to carry out a new wartime financial and economic policy. Its main points are as follows. First, the purpose of the new policy is to guarantee all the necessary supplies for the anti-Japanese armed forces, meet the people's demand for daily necessities, and struggle against the enemy's economic blockade and economic sabotage. Second, reestablish national defense industries in the interior in a planned way, starting from the small-scale and most urgent

branches, and gradually developing and improving them, and drawing in the capital of the government, the people, and foreign countries. In addition, mobilize the workers politically, guarantee their minimum material benefits, and improve the system of factory management, so as to increase productivity. This is not only necessary but possible. Third, using a combination of political mobilization and government decrees, develop national agricultural and handicraft production, organize spring plowing and autumn harvest campaigns, and thus cause the national agriculture and handicraft to develop in a new guise. We should take care to protect agricultural tool, livestock, and handicraft workshops, and guarantee the economic self-sufficiency of the separated districts. Fourth, protect the free operation of private industrial and commercial enterprises, and at the same time pay attention to developing cooperative ventures. Fifth, on the basis of the principle of "those who have money give money," revise all the old taxes into a unified progressive tax and abolish the vexatious system of apportionment, in order to ease the burden on the people and increase the revenue. Sixth, using a combination of political mobilization and government decrees, collect [contributions to] national salvation bonds and public grain for national salvation. In addition, mobilize the people to donate funds and grain for the combat troops to complement their financial income. Seventh, fight in a planned way against the enemy's policy of issuing puppet currency and sabotaging the national currency; allow the separated districts to set up their local banks and issue local paper currency. Eighth, strenuously encourage the movement for honesty and cleanliness, revise the method for paying soldiers, and, on the basis of the minimum standard of living, establish a payment system which will be broadly egalitarian. Ninth, the national bank should start giving out low-interest loans to help develop the production and circulation of goods. Tenth, restore and develop the postal and communication services in the war zones. The above are only general indications. We must have the determination to reform the old system carefully and apply the new system, and persist in this. Only thus can we eliminate the new difficulties and sustain the protracted war. The heart of the matter lies in organizing the activism of the broad masses of the ordinary people and allowing them to contribute to the victory of the war. China's War of Resistance is proceeding under special circumstances. The major big cities and lines of communication have been occupied by the enemy, and the main support of the War of Resistance is the countryside and the peasants. The peasants have great strength to support the war, but we should carry out the necessary political and economic reforms. The various new policies we are talking about here are being proposed on the basis of this special situation.

10. Carry Out a Resistance War Education Policy, and Let Education Serve the Protracted War

Under the principle that everything serves the war, we should make all the cultural and educational institutions meet the demands of the war. Hence, the tenth task of the whole nation is to carry out the following cultural and educational policies.

First, revise the school system, eliminate courses that are neither urgent nor necessary, and change the system of management on the basis of the principle that teaching should focus on the courses that are needed in the war, and bring into play the students' enthusiasm in their study. Second, establish, enlarge, and strengthen all kinds of cadre schools to train large numbers of anti-Japanese cadres. Third, extensively develop education for the popular masses, organize a variety of continuation schools, literacy campaigns, drama campaigns, singing campaigns, and sports campaigns. Publish all kinds of popular local newspapers at the front and in the enemy's rear, to raise the national culture and national consciousness of the people. Fourth, organize free primary education, in order to educate the next generation in our national spirit. All the above should be carried out through a combination of political mobilization and government decrees. The emphasis should be on mobilizing the people to educate themselves, but the government should give proper guidance, regulation, and possible material assistance. It is far from sufficient to fulfill the great task of raising the national culture and national conscientiousness simply to depend on a few schools and newspapers run by the government with a limited budget. Ever since the War of Resistance began, the educational system has been undergoing changes. Especially in the war zones, striking progress has been made. In spite of that, there have still been no changes in the overall system adequate to the demands of the War of Resistance. This is not a good thing. The great War of Resistance must be accompanied by a great Resistance War education movement. The phenomenon of a lack of cooperation between the two must be eliminated as soon as possible.

11. Strive to Obtain International Assistance, Concentrate All Our Strength to Fight Against Japanese Imperialism

Starting from the principles of protracted war and concentrating all our strength to fight against Japanese imperialism, we cannot neglect organizing all possible foreign aid. Therefore, the eleventh task at present is as follows. First, resolutely oppose the views of some people who advocate the so-called policy of following the German and Italian line, for this is in fact a kind of procedure for preparing to surrender to the enemy. Second, strive to increase the material assistance to us from the democratic countries and the Soviet Union, and at the same time do our utmost to induce all the countries in the League of Nations to approve the resolution imposing sanctions against Japan. Third, set up certain agencies to collect systematically information regarding the atrocities of the enemy armies, prepare specific documents and reports, and publicize them abroad to arouse the attention of the whole world, and induce them to take action to punish the Japanese fascists. Fourth, select representatives from all the parties, factions, and popular bodies, organize them into international propaganda groups, and let them travel from country to country to arouse the sympathy of the people and governments of every country, and induce them to cooperate with the diplomatic activities of our gov-

ernment. Fifth, protect all those foreigners in China whose countries are sympathetic to us, and their peaceful business and missionary activities. Sixth, take care to protect the interests of the overseas Chinese, and, moreover, through the efforts of the overseas Chinese, push forward in every country the movement to oppose Japan and aid China. We must do all these things energetically, regardless of the level of assistance from these countries, of whether it may temporarily not have increased or even have partially decreased, or of whether the resolution of the League of Nations remains just a few good-sounding words. In accordance with the long-term nature of the War of Resistance, our foreign policy orientation should also be focused on the long term, emphasizing not our immediate interests, but assistance in the future. Such a far-sighted view is essential.

12. Establish an Anti-Invasion United Front of the Chinese and Japanese Soldiers and People, and of the Oppressed Nations in Korea, Taiwan, and Elsewhere, to Fight Together Against Japanese Imperialism

The war of aggression by Japanese imperialism does not threaten only the Chinese people. At the same time, it threatens all the soldiers and people of Japan and the oppressed nations of Korea and Taiwan. If we want to cause the Japanese invasion to fail, the broad masses of soldiers and people of the two great nations of China and Japan and the oppressed nations of Korea and Taiwan should undertake vast and persistent common efforts, and establish a joint anti-invasion united front. In pursuit of this objective, the twelfth task facing the whole nation is as follows. First, put forward this orientation of an anti-invasion united front to the great masses of people and soldiers in the two countries, and the nations of Korea and Taiwan, and call on them to struggle for it. Second, the government should issue an order to the effect that all the officers and soldiers in the anti-Japanese armies and the anti-Japanese guerrilla units should learn the necessary number of appropriate Japanese words. Senior political departments should prepare and send out Japanese teachers to different armies to teach, start from a few words to being able to lecture the Japanese officers and soldiers on some principles. Teach all the anti-Japanese officers and soldiers to make oral propaganda to all the enemy soldiers and junior officers, supplemented by propaganda through writing and pictures. Gradually help them to change by persuasion, make them agree to setting up a joint anti-invasion united front, turn the million-strong Japanese invading army into an army friendly to us, which will withdraw from China and overthrow Japanese fascism. Third, respect and give preferential treatment to enemy captives, educate them, through them influence the others to work hard for the establishment of an anti-invasion united front. Fourth, find a way to organize anti-invasion cultural workers within Japan to come to China and join this struggle. Fifth, protect the honest Japanese residents in China. Sixth, teach the great masses of soldiers and people. On the one hand, we should raise our national dignity. On the

other hand, we should correct some of the wrong ideas in the army as well as among the people, distinguish Japanese imperialism from the Japanese people, distinguish enemy officers from the soldiers, and also distinguish the senior officers from the junior officers. After we have carried out the above orientation and methods, and made extensive and resolute efforts, this anti-invasion united front can be established. China's victory will depend mainly on the increase in its own strength; but, at the same time, the enemy's difficulties and international assistance must be obtained to supplement this. As regards the enemy's difficulties, apart from the gradual drain resulting from our persistence in the protracted war, and the gradual isolation of the enemy resulting from our strenuous diplomatic activity, the policy of building a joint anti-invasion united front with the Japanese soldiers and people and the nations of Korea and Taiwan is a part that cannot be omitted. The longer the Japanese war of aggression lasts, the more likely there will be a foundation to set up such a united front.

13. Unite All China's Nationalities, Stand Together Against Japan

Our Anti-Japanese National United Front does not consist only of all the parties and factions and all the classes in the country; it also includes all the nationalities in the country. In response to the enemy's conspiracy to split all the minority nationalities in our country, which has already been carried out and will continue to be carried out, the thirteenth task at the moment is to unite all the nationalities as one and resist the Japanese bandits together. For this purpose, we must pay attention to the following points. First, give the Meng [Mongolian], Hui [Muslim], Zang [Tibetan], Miao, Yao, Yi, Fan, and all the other nationalities equal rights with the Han. Under the principle of joint resistance to Japan, they have the right to manage their own affairs, while at the same time uniting with the Han to establish a unified state. Second, in the regions where various minority nationalities live together with the Han, the local governments should set up committees made up of members of the local minority nationalities as one department of the provincial and *xian* governments. These committees manage the affairs concerning them, mediate in relations among different nationalities, and have some seats in the provincial and *xian* governments. Third, respect the culture, religion, and customs of all the minority nationalities. Not only should we not force them to learn to read and write Chinese, but we should support and assist them in developing their own culture and education in their own languages and using their own form of writing. Fourth, correct the existing Han chauvinism, and encourage the Han to deal with the other nationalities on an equal basis, so that all the nationalities will daily become more friendly and intimate with one another. At the same time, forbid any insulting and contemptuous language, literature, and behavior directed at them. As regards the above policy, on the one hand, the various minority nationalities should unite among themselves and strive to bring about its realization, and, on

the other hand, the government should spontaneously carry it out. Only thus can the relations among all the nationalities in the country be thoroughly improved, and the goal of uniting to fight against the intruders be truly achieved. The old hesitant and slow method will not work.

14. Rigorously Carry Out the Campaign Against Traitors, Strengthen Both the Front and the Rear

In the new situation, Chinese traitors, enemy spies, Trotskyites, and pro-Japanese elements will surely be even more rampant than before and carry out their conspiracies of spreading rumors, insults, division, and sabotage. Hence the fourteenth task at present lies in applying the following methods to carry out resolutely the campaign against traitors. First, arouse the vigilance of all the soldiers and people at the front as well as in the rear, and watch closely the activities of Chinese traitors, enemy spies, Trotskyites, and pro-Japanese elements. In accordance with the laws of the government, execute them without the slightest mercy. Second, be careful to protect state secrets. Execute for high treason those renegades who leak state secrets. Third, add a chapter on treason to the school textbooks, carry out the education to raise the level of vigilance. Fourth, set up counterespionage departments at all levels to manage the work of counterespionage in the military; set up counterespionage small groups in the organizations of the popular masses and in the people's self-defense teams. Emphasize education in counterespionage among the national police forces so that, under the close watch of the people, these traitors and spies have nowhere to hide. Ever since the War of Resistance began, we have suffered countless losses because of these traitors and spies. The generals and soldiers at the front are amazed at the large number of Chinese traitors and the magnitude of the losses caused by them to the war effort and long ago unanimously demanded such a policy. Even in the rear, the leaking of national secrets and guiding in of the cruel bombardments by enemy planes have already aroused the anger and hatred of Heaven and man. If the traitors and spies are not eliminated in a protracted War of Resistance, we can hardly expect this war to be victorious. To mobilize the national revolutionary vigilance of the broad popular masses, forcefully carry out the above methods for combating treason, and turn it into a vast campaign is a serious task that is indispensable in gaining final victory. We should point out: the campaign against traitors must take care to distinguish the ringleader from the subordinate, the conscious participant from one who has been deceived, and those who are resolute from those who are wavering. They should be treated differently, the former more severely, the latter let off more lightly. In addition, we should pay attention to winning the latter over and persuading them to turn toward the good. We must absolutely not treat everyone in the same way. We must also pay attention to the reliability of the evidence, not make use of inquisition by torture, and be strictly on guard against framing a case against anyone. The goal of the campaign against

traitors is to eliminate the real traitors and spies, and this goal can be attained only through correct policies and methods.

15. Develop the Guomintang and the Communist Party, as Well as All Anti-Japanese Parties; Strengthen the United Front, and Support a Protracted War

All the urgent tasks dealt with above require that the various parties belonging to the Anti-Japanese National United Front propel the whole nation forward, to carry them out resolutely under the unified leadership of Chairman Chiang. It is impossible to attain this goal without developing the organizational capacity of all the parties participating in the united front. The present force of all parties without exception is too small, and to develop greatly the Guomintang and the Communist Party in particular is an urgent task at present. In this task of development, every party should support and assist the development of the other parties, instead of envying one another and obstructing one another. We must be aware that so long as it is an anti-Japanese party, the development of any party will benefit the War of Resistance against Japan. Without a doubt, the Guomintang and the Communist Party constitute the basis of the united front, and, of these two parties, the Guomintang is the backbone. We recognize this fact. Therefore, we firmly support Chairman Chiang and the National Government and Guomintang under his leadership. Moreover, we call on the whole nation to give him their unanimous support. To recognize and support this backbone but, at the same time, to develop every party are related and not conflicting policies.

In terms of the number, I think that the Guomintang should expand to over five million, while the Communist Party plus the other parties should expand to over one million. In a great nation with a population of 450 million people, during the great period of the War of Resistance, it is not only necessary but entirely possible to attract several million outstanding elements to join these anti-Japanese parties. If this really happens, the Anti-Japanese National United Front will be expanded, and as a result will be further consolidated, and there will be ample guarantees for carrying out all the tasks to defeat the enemy. We will not need to worry any more about achieving the fundamental objective of sustaining the protracted war and long-term cooperation, to expel the Japanese invaders and build a new China of the Three People's Principles.

V. The Protracted War and Long-Term Cooperation

Let us now focus on the question of the long-term characteristics of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and give those who are especially concerned about relations between the Guomintang and the Communist Party, and who have already had many questions, a complete answer. This has great significance in terms of strengthening and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front,

strengthening and expanding cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party, carrying out smoothly the current urgent tasks, and tiding over a difficult moment in the war.

This problem includes the following points: the protractedness of the war determines the protractedness of cooperation; cooperation during the war determines cooperation after the war; the contents and major conditions of long-term cooperation; the Three People's Principles and communism; the organizational form of long-term cooperation; the policy of mutual assistance and mutual accommodation in long-term cooperation; and the problem of a democratic republic. All these are questions that many people are concerned about, and we must give explicit answers to all of them.

1. The Protracted Character of the War Determines the Protracted Character of Cooperation

Because the War of Resistance against Japan is protracted, the entire Anti-Japanese National United Front can and must be long-lasting. In this process, cooperation between the two major parties—the Guomintang and the Communist Party—also can and must be long-term. This is the starting point for all our policies. Therefore, whatever happens, our policy is to demand a long-term national united front and long-term cooperation. Whatever happens, we demand unanimous support for a unified government and oppose discord and division. Only such policies will help us pull through the difficulties of the war, face up to the enemy's sabotage, beat back Japanese imperialism, and, finally, after the war is over, carry out the task of building a new China. This is fundamentally different from the cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party from 1924 to 1927. At that time, it was short-term cooperation; this time it is long-term cooperation.

2. Cooperation During the War Determines Cooperation After the War

What we call long-term cooperation means cooperation not only during the war but also after the war. The War of Resistance against Japan is protracted, and the cooperation during the war can already be described as long-term. Yet it is not enough that we hope to continue this cooperation; we definitely must continue this cooperation. What guarantees do we have? The guarantee is that cooperation during the war determines cooperation after the war. The major parties in the anti-Japanese united front—the Guomintang and the Communist Party—must share the difficulties as well as a common fate and strive to make progress. Moreover, only after long-term efforts can they defeat Japanese imperialism; otherwise they cannot. When the war is over, these two parties that have shared adversities and made progress together will have a basis for continued cooperation. It can already

be predicted that domestic and international conditions then will be more favorable for cooperation. Without a doubt, cooperation during the war must have different contents at different periods, and cooperation after the war will have even more new contents. But the cooperation during the war will determine that they can cooperate after the war. This is not a groundless prediction.

3. *The Content and Major Conditions for Long-Term Cooperation*

So-called long-term cooperation means the long-term national united front. Every class, from capitalists to workers, every political party, from the Guomindang to the Communist Party, every nationality, from the Han nationality to the small nationalities like the Miao and Yao, every army, from the Central Army to the Eighth Route Army, every government, from the National Government to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government—with the sole exception of the national traitors—all of these are included and, moreover, are always included. In the national united front during the protracted war, some people certainly cannot survive the hard struggle, and when personal interest surpasses the national interest they will become national traitors. Thus the national united front must continuously exclude these national traitors. Yet, after the exclusion of these, it still remains the national united front. The reason lies in the major conditions of long-term cooperation and in the first instance in the barbarism and protracted character of the war. Because the barbarism of the enemy's war gravely threatens the survival of every class of the whole nation, this forces the upper classes to resist Japan together with the other classes. It is inevitable that some among the upper class will withdraw from the anti-Japanese front, but broadly speaking, the remainder of the upper class are oppressed and have no way out but to revolt. Besides, because this barbaric war is long, it determines that cooperation will also be long-term. These facts constitute one aspect that determines the long-term cooperation. Yet there is a second aspect, which requires all the parties to the cooperation, first of all, the Guomindang and the Communists Party, to adopt correct policies and conduct necessary work. What kind of policies and work? They should be the policies and work that are decided and carried out on the basis of the long-term war and long-term cooperation. They should be the policies and work that take account of the present as well as the future, take account of this class as well as that class, take account of this party as well as that party, take account of this army as well as that army, take account of this nationality as well as that nationality. Otherwise, the policies are wrong, and the work is poorly done, everything is in a mess from within the united front itself, and the cooperation will not last long. So, on the one hand, the barbarism and long-term character of the enemy's war and, on the other hand, the correct policies and necessary work in the united front will ensure that the Chinese national united front not only should be, but also can be long-term. It is a national front and not a people's front. It includes cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party during and after the war, in-

stead of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party that is expected to split and lead to a civil war after this war is over.

4. *The Three People's Principles and Communism*

The Three People's Principles are the political foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. But what is the relationship between the Three People's Principles and communism? What kind of attitude should Communist Party members adopt toward the Three People's Principles? Even down to the present day, some people are still not clear about this, so it is necessary to explain the matter once again.

Already in May 1936 at our Party's provisional congress we adopted the following outline on "resolutely carrying out the Three People's Principles":¹²

Does the Communist Party agree with the Three People's Principles? Our answer is: "Yes, we do." The Three People's Principles have undergone changes in the course of their history. The revolutionary Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yatsen won the people's confidence and launched the great victorious revolution of 1924–1927 because they were resolutely applied as a result of cooperation with the Communist Party. On the other hand, as a result of turning on the Communist Party (during the party purge) and pursuing an opposite policy, the people's confidence was lost, the revolution was defeated. . . . Now that there are extremely grave national and social crises . . . , the people of the whole country and the patriots within the Guomindang are urgently demanding cooperation between the two parties. Consequently, it is completely in keeping with the historical requirements of the Chinese revolution that the essence of the Three People's Principles should be revived and restored; that the two parties should resume their cooperation, in accordance with the principle of Nationalism, or the struggle for national independence and liberation in dealing with foreign countries, the principle of People's Rights, or the attainment of internal democracy and freedom, and the principle of People's Livelihood, or the promotion of the people's welfare, and that they should lead the people to put these principles resolutely into practice. This ought to be clearly grasped by every member of the Communist Party. Communists will never abandon their ideal of socialism and communism, which they will attain by going through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Communist Party has its own party and political program. Its party program is one of socialism and communism, which is different from the Three People's Principles. Even its democratic revolutionary political program is more thorough than that of any other party in China, although it is basically not in conflict with the Three People's

12. The reference is to point 11 of Mao's "Outline of a Political Report at the Party Congress of the Soviet Regions," entitled "The Tasks of the Chinese National United Front Against Japan at the Present Stage," delivered not in May 1936 but on May 3, 1937. We reproduce the relevant passages from Volume V, pp. 644–45, as Mao delivered them at that time, indicating omissions by ellipses. For the variants between this text and the revised version which appears in the *Selected Works*, see the full text in Volume V.

Principles as proclaimed by the Guomindang at its first and second congresses. Therefore, far from rejecting the Three People's Principles, we are ready staunchly to put them into practice; moreover, we ask the Guomindang to implement them together with us, and we call upon the entire nation to put them into effect, so that the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country shall unite and fight for these three great objectives of national independence, people's rights and freedom, and the livelihood and happiness of the people. ("The Tasks of the Chinese National United Front Against Japan at the Present Stage," p. 11)¹³

On September 22 last year, in the declaration of the establishment of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party by our Party's Central Committee, we stressed: "Mr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization."¹⁴

Why does a Communist political party adopt such an attitude? Clearly, national independence, democratic freedom, and the happiness of people's livelihood are precisely the general objectives the Communist Party wants to realize in the national-democratic stage of the revolution. They are also the general objectives the people of the whole country want to realize instead of the things that are demanded by a certain party alone. If you will just have a look at the documents and political guiding principles of the Communist Party since its foundation, you will understand this. Therefore, in the past, not just during the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party from 1924 to 1927, our Communist Party resolutely carried out the Three People's Principles. Even after the unfortunate breakup of the cooperation between the two parties in 1927, none of our deeds violated the Three People's Principles. At that time, we were firmly opposed to imperialism, and this was in conformity with nationalism; we carried out the political system of people's representative congresses, and this corresponded to democracy; we also applied the agrarian system of land to the tillers, which fitted in with the people's livelihood. At that time, none of our actions went beyond the fundamental concept of private ownership of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In order to carry out thoroughly this task of the democratic stage, all Communist Party members should, without the slightest doubt, in accordance with their own consistent revolutionary general principles, and their own resolutions and declarations, earnestly and sincerely carry out the Three People's Principles, together with the Chinese Guomindang, the other parties in the country, and all the

people of the country. Whoever does not loyally believe in and carry out the Three People's Principles is saying one thing and meaning another, or thinking in one way and behaving in another, and is not a loyal Marxist. In China, all loyal Marxists have at the same time the two responsibilities of current practical tasks and great future ideals. Furthermore, we must be aware that only when the present assignments are fulfilled as thoroughly as possible will we have the basis and foundation for developing into the future period of great ideals. The so-called great future ideals refer to communism, which is the perfect social system for mankind. Mr. Sun Yatsen once believed that only when it was realized could the social problems of the future be resolved. "Present practical tasks" refers to the Three People's Principles. This is the basic task in the current stage of "seeking equal international status, equal political status, and equal economic status." It is the common demand of the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country. Therefore, just as they study communism, Communist Party members should carefully study the Three People's Principles. They should study the theory of the Three People's Principles from a Marxist perspective, study how the Three People's Principles can be concretely applied, study how to use the authentic ideas of the Three People's Principles to teach the popular masses about the Three People's Principles, teach them so that they will proceed from understanding to active application, and struggle hard to defeat Japanese imperialism and build a new China of the Three People's Principles.

5. The Organizational Form of Long-Term Cooperation

To guarantee long-term cooperation, we must also solve the problem of the organizational form of the cooperation. We have already refuted the doctrine of a single party. No matter whether in terms of past history, the present tasks, or the nature of Chinese society, the doctrine of a single party is groundless. It can never be carried out and will not work. It violates the great objective of uniting as one to resist Japan and build the country; it produces much harm but no benefit. Well, then, does the coexistence of all the parties and their mutual union in an Anti-Japanese National United Front require a kind of common organization? Yes, it does. The absence of such a unified common organization will be disadvantageous to resistance against Japan, and even more disadvantageous to long-term cooperation. Hence every party should study it carefully and find a unified common organizational form that best fits in with long-term cooperation. Let us now consider this.

Because of the historic peculiarities of Chinese politics and economics, as well as of the various parties, it appears from today's perspective that the Anti-Japanese National United Front may have the following three organizational forms.

In the first kind, the Guomindang itself becomes a national league. Every party joins the Guomindang, while maintaining its independence, but this is different from the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. If the Guomindang agrees that Communists can join it, what should be our attitude?

13. As can be seen from the previous note, the title of Mao's report of May 3, 1937, is given correctly here, but the reference at the end should be to section 11, not page 11.

14. The declaration in question was, in fact, drafted by the Chinese Communist Party on July 4, 1937. September 22 is the date on which the Guomindang finally agreed to publish it. The next day, Chiang Kaishek made a statement recognizing the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party. The appearance of these two documents marked the formal beginning of Guomindang-Communist collaboration. The text of the Communist statement can be found in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 147, where it is quoted in an editorial written by Mao dated October 5, 1943.

First, we approve of this method because it is one of the best unified organizational forms of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and will benefit resistance to Japan and the building of the country. Not only the Communist Party but also any other anti-Japanese party or faction can join the Guomindang. If the Guomindang approves, we will certainly never object. If the matter is handled in this way, we may adopt a method different from that in the cooperation in the year 13 [of the Republic]. To begin with, all those Communist Party members who join the Guomindang should do so openly, and a list of their names should be handed over to the leading organs of the Guomindang. Second, do not accept any Guomindang members into the Communist Party. If there are some people who want to join, they should be persuaded not to do so, taking into account the situation as a whole. Third, if our young Party members are allowed to join the Three People's Principles Youth League with the approval of the Guomindang, we would do the same thing, not organizing secret groups in the league, and not admitting nonmembers of the Communist Party into our Party. With this method, everybody will live in peace, and this will be beneficial rather than harmful. This is the first kind of organizational form of the united front.

The second kind of organizational form of the united front is that all the parties together organize a national union and support Mr. Chiang Kaishek as the supreme leader of this union. Every party will send its representatives on a basis of equality to form central as well as various local joint committees to work hard to carry out the common guiding principles and deal with matters of common interest. This is another very good organizational form, which we approve. We proposed it long ago, but unfortunately it has not been adopted.

The third kind of organizational form of the united front is the present method. There are no written regulations, nothing is fixed, but when something occurs the parties discuss it together to solve the problems concerning them both. But this form of organization is not sufficiently close, and many problems cannot be properly and promptly solved. For instance, the application of many overall political policies and the adjustment of friction at the lower levels are all delayed because there is no fixed organization, so these problems persist. Hence this method is not advantageous for long-term cooperation. Nevertheless, if the first and second methods are impossible, this method will have to be continued temporarily.

In sum, the problem of the form of organization for long-term cooperation during the protracted war is an important issue. We strongly support a kind of unified form so that it will benefit long-term cooperation.

6. The Policy of Mutual Assistance and Mutual Accommodation in Long-Term Cooperation

We have said already that a protracted war requires a long-term united front. This is the starting point for all our policies. Consequently, in their work, and in their relations with allied parties, Communist Party members should pay attention ev-

erywhere and at all times to this long-term characteristic. They should resolutely and bravely perform all work which will benefit long-term cooperation and absolutely never do anything which will harm long-term cooperation.

Here there arises the problem of mutual assistance and mutual accommodation among different parties. As regards mutual assistance, for example, every party wants to develop and be strengthened, but apart from developing and strengthening itself, every party should support and assist the development and strengthening of its allied parties. What kind of attitude should Communist Party members adopt toward the development and strengthening of the Guomindang? In a word, to support and assist. The reasons are that the development and strengthening of the Guomindang will benefit the War of Resistance against Japan, benefit the whole nation, and consequently benefit the toiling people and the Communist Party as well, as I have already said. Now that the Guomindang is organizing the Three People's Principles Youth League, what attitude should Communists take toward this? Without a doubt, we will adopt the attitude of support and assistance. We hope that the Three People's Principles Youth League will develop extensively on the basis of Mr. Chiang Kaishek's declaration about it, and that the development of this league will have a bright future. Precisely because of [our] support and assistance, we hope that there will be some revision and adjustment regarding certain articles in its present rules. Otherwise good motives will not necessarily lead to good results. The Three People's Principles Youth League should become a unified organization for all the masses of young people throughout the country to unite in and save the country. It should absorb individual young people and youth groups of every party, every faction, and every sphere, so that it becomes a vast body in which the entire younger generation will receive education and training for the national revolution. Therefore, organizationally it should be democratized, politically it should bring into play the spontaneous and conscious spirit of the league members, bring into play the initiative of the masses of young people. This is our attitude toward and understanding of the Three People's Principles Youth League.

Mutual assistance is not mutual harm. Hurting others to benefit oneself is wrong in terms of individual morality, and even more wrong in terms of national morality. Therefore, unreasonable friction, even going so far as to seize and kill people, is absolutely wrong under any circumstances. Communist Party members must absolutely never treat our allied parties in this way. Moreover, if our allied parties treat us like this, we will never remain silent. It is only right and fair to oneself as well as to others if a serious attitude is adopted in dealing with irrational actions. To point out one another's mistakes is virtue between friends, and it is also the style that should be encouraged between political parties.

Are there any mutual accommodations in the united front? Yes, there are. We once made some political concessions, that is, we stopped confiscating the land, reorganized the Red Army, changed the system in the soviet areas. These were a kind of political concessions, a necessary step in order to set up the united front

and to unite all the people to fight against the enemy together. Our allied parties made some concessions, too, such as recognizing the legitimate status of the Communist Party and so on. This kind of policy of mutual accommodation for the purpose of united resistance to Japan and long-term cooperation is very good and very correct. Only those who are politically muddle-headed or people with something else in their minds could say the Communist Party surrendered to the Guomindang or vice versa.

Now we also advocate that all the parties in the united front will not recruit party members, organize branches, or conduct secret activities in the other parties. We consider that such a policy is necessary. Naturally it is different now from the past. Previously, in the period of civil war, apart from the open war between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, they both used secret means to conduct activities to sabotage each other. After the establishment of cooperation, there certainly should not be any motives or actions for sabotaging each other, but the method of secretly recruiting party members and organizing branches in the other's party must also be terminated, in order to reassure both sides. Only this is compatible with the goal of long-term cooperation in a protracted war. Now we formally declare to our comrades of the Guomindang: we will halt all activity to recruit party members and organize branches in your party, and we will continue this policy no matter what kind of common organizational forms the united front may take. But meanwhile, we hope that you will do the same. After the two sides have come to an agreement, if any lower-ranking party members violate it, the leading institutions of the violator are responsible for dealing with the matter.

Apart from this, in communications between the comrades from the two sides, they should adopt the attitudes of modesty, respect, and discussion instead of arrogance, contempt, and arbitrary action to improve bilateral relations. This is also necessary.

Communist Party members should be the first to carry out all these things which we have said. Even though some people on the other side may not have treated us in accordance with the same policy, methods, and attitude, we will proceed with our policy. After we have done so for some time, those on the other side who fail to understand for a time will be able to see.

Communist Party members should persist in their stands regarding all the causes on behalf of the country and the people. From beginning to end, they should walk consistently in the direction of defeating the Japanese bandits and building a new China. Whoever violates this stand, this orientation, no longer qualifies as a Communist Party member. But Communist Party members must also have the spirit of mutual assistance and mutual accommodation; they must have the spirit of respecting our allied parties and solving problems with the comrades of our allied parties by negotiating with a modest and amiable attitude. Wherever there are comrades of our allied parties, we should solve the relevant problems through negotiations with them, instead of being arbitrary and dictatorial. Without this spirit, we will not be able to strengthen unity and solidarity, nor will it be possible

to achieve the so-called cause of the country and the people and the objective of defeating the Japanese invaders and building a new China. Consequently, we should never regard the necessary policy of mutual accommodation as negative behavior. Not only is mutual assistance positive, but mutual accommodation is positive as well, for necessary accommodation is the indispensable condition for strengthening the cooperation between the two parties and seeking better unity and greater progress.

7. *The Question of a Democratic Republic*

Although our Party published the resolution on founding a democratic republic as early as September 1936, and although the comrades of the Central Committee have repeatedly explained this matter, many people outside our Party still do not understand our proposal. This is a question related to the future of the War of Resistance. What will be the outcome of the War of Resistance? In the last analysis, what does the so-called War of Resistance and building the nation mean in the view of the Communist Party? What kind of country do we want to build? This is a real question. To explain it again will help to strengthen the confidence of all the parties and factions in long-term cooperation.

What kind of country do we want to build? To answer in a single sentence, we want to build a republic of the Three People's Principles.

What we call a democratic republic is actually a republic of the Three People's Principles; its nature is that of the Three People's Principles. According to Mr. Sun Yatsen's formulation, it is a country "that seeks equal international status, equal political status, and equal economic status." First, this country is a nationalist country. It is an independent country, which will not tolerate any foreign interference and, at the same time, will not interfere in any foreign countries. That is to say that China's original semicolonial status will be changed, and it will become independent. At the same time, no matter how strong and prosperous it has become, it will never become imperialist, but it will have peaceful relations in a spirit of equality with all the friendly countries that respect the independence of China, on a basis of coexistence and mutual benefit. As regards the nationalities within the country, it will give them equal rights and set up a unified government based on the principle of voluntariness. Second, this country is a country of people's rights.¹⁵ All the people in the country have equal political status; all the government officials and civil servants are elected by the people. The political system is one of democratic centralism. A national assembly and local assemblies made up of the people's representatives will be established. Regardless of class, sex, nationality, belief, and cultural level, all citizens over eighteen except criminals have the right to vote and to stand for election. The state gives the people freedom of speech, publica-

15. Mao here uses Sun Yatsen's term of *minquan* ("people's rights"), which can equally well be translated "democracy" or "democratic."

tion, assembly, association, belief, residence, and migration, and further protects them politically and materially. Third, this is a country of people's livelihood. It does not deny private ownership. Yet it guarantees that workers have jobs and their working conditions are improved; peasants have land, and heavy taxes and high rent and interest rates are abolished; students can go to schools, and the poor people will have a chance to receive education; all the other classes have work to do, so they will be able to show their talents. In a word, the state will see to it that everybody has clothing, food, a chance to receive education, and work. What we call a democratic republic is such a country, a genuine Republic of China of the Three People's Principles. It is not a soviet, nor is it socialism.

Against whom must we struggle if China wants to become such a country? We must struggle against Japanese imperialism. Japanese imperialism has deprived us of our independence, and we must demand our independence from it. Japanese imperialism treats us as slaves, and we must demand freedom from it. Japanese imperialism makes us suffer from hunger and cold, and we must demand food from it. How shall we make these demands? Use guns against them. In short, when we have driven out Japanese imperialism, we will have an independent, free, happy new Republic of China of the Three People's Principles.

VI. China's War to Resist Invasion and the World Antifascist Movement

1. China and the World Cannot Be Separated

China is already closely united with the world. The Sino-Japanese war is one part of the world war, and the victory of the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan cannot be considered independently, apart from the world. In the new situation of the War of Resistance, it is possible that part of foreign assistance may be temporarily reduced. This increases the significance of Chinese self-reliance. At all times China must depend primarily on self-reliance. But China is not and never can become isolated. The fact that China is intimately linked with the world is also our standpoint, and it must be our standpoint. We are not and never can be isolationists. China could not have been isolated a long time ago, and now that a worldwide imperialism has intervened in China by war, all the people of China are concerned about the relationships between the world and China. They are particularly concerned about the changes in the situation in Europe. Therefore, it is quite meaningful for us to analyze the current international situation.

2. The Second World War to Redivide the World Has Already Begun

The nature of capitalist imperialism is not only in contradiction with the broad masses of the people in their own countries, but is in contradiction with the colonies and semicolonies and with the socialist countries, and, moreover, there are

contradictions between the various imperialist countries themselves. The most acute expression of this last type of contradictions in history was the world war twenty years ago. The consequence of that war between two groups of imperialist countries was the birth of a new international situation. As a result of the new political and economic developments in the world after that war, the world has been brought again to the brink of a new great war. After the invasion of the Four Eastern Provinces by the Japanese bandits in the East, and Hitler's rise to power in the West, a new war to redivide the world has already begun. The slogan "Fascism means war" is absolutely correct. Under these circumstances, on the one hand, Japan, Germany, and Italy have set up an invasion front, carrying out invasions on a large scale. On the other hand, the democratic countries are preparing for a war in the name of peace to protect the advantages they have already obtained, but as yet they have not been willing to use force to stop the invaders. In particular, the appeasement policy of Great Britain has helped the invaders. Under these circumstances, China's Four Eastern Provinces were first sacrificed, then Abyssinia was conquered by Italy, and Spain encouraged the arrogance of the rebel army. China is again facing a new large-scale invasion by the Japanese bandits, and then very recently Austria and Czechoslovakia were sacrificed to Hitler one after the other. Six hundred million people in the entire world have been drawn into this war, and its scope has been extended to Asia, Africa, and Europe. This is the current situation of the new world war.

3. The Characteristics of the World War at Present

As a result, on the one hand, of the resolute determination of the fascist countries—Japan, Germany, and Italy—to carry out invasions and, on the other hand, of the reluctance of the democratic countries to impose sanctions by force, especially the British policy of appeasement, the current situation of the new world war exhibits characteristics different from those of the First World War, namely, the invasion of the neutral countries first and the adoption of different forms of war. China, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia are either semi-independent or small countries. Japan, Germany, and Italy first chose these fat little morsels and swallowed them. In their invasion of these neutral countries, the invaders used three particular forms of war. The first kind was that of Japan's war against China and Italy's war against Abyssinia. These were open and large-scale wars, yet they were carried out without a declaration of war, thus opening a new era in the history of war. The purpose of using this method of undeclared war lies in the fact that the invaders, taking advantage of the reluctance of the democratic countries to impose sanctions, and particularly Britain's policy of appeasement, temporarily avoided direct clashes, thus facilitating their operations to capture the neutral countries first. The second kind is the form of invasion of Spain by Italy and Germany. They adopted the method of assisting the rebel army. This is a repetition of an old method in history; there were such examples in history. The third kind is the form Hitler

used to invade Austria and Czechoslovakia; there was no appearance of war (there was no shooting), but there was the reality of war. He sent out large and strong military forces, and they occupied all of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia. In addition, he brought the rest of Czechoslovakia under his control. This is the best method for subjugating a people's country without fighting a war. The adoption of these three methods results entirely from the fact that, on the one hand, the aggressors themselves do not have sufficient strength, so it is wise to avoid direct conflict with the big powers. Consequently, they use clever methods of waging war, in an attempt to first make themselves stronger, while simultaneously the great powers are being weakened, after which they will fight against them. On the other hand, it was the result of the fact that none of the democratic countries was willing to stop the aggressors, and especially of British cowardliness and appeasement. In reality, this kind of policy assisted the aggressors, and made it easier for them to invade the neutral countries.

4. British Appeasement Will Lead the Fascist Countries to Carry Out Larger-Scale Wars

Just now, the British conservative cabinet headed by [Neville] Chamberlain is gradually carrying out its so-called policy of the cooperation of the four big powers. After the Munich Agreement, it is possible that the political situation in Europe may temporarily take a turn for the worse. The policies of the majority of the British Conservative Party have always been based on the principle of rejecting the Soviet Union and appeasing Germany and Italy, because they fear the strength and prosperity of the Soviet Union and fear that they themselves may become involved in the war too soon. They fear the movements of their own people and the independence movements in the colonies, and they had long ago resolved to sacrifice Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to fulfill their goal of excluding the Soviet Union and appeasing Germany and Italy. In the past, because of the lack of unity within the Conservative Party itself, the active policy of the French Popular Front, and the criticism by both domestic and international public opinion, they did not succeed in this. Now, taking advantage of the reluctance of the people of Britain and of all Europe to fight wars, and of the rightism of the French Flandin faction,¹⁶ under Hitler's threat of force, the Munich Agreement was signed. This agreement is the consequence of British appeasement. If Britain does not change its policy, it will inevitably lead the fascist countries to launch adventurist wars on an even larger scale. Although war between the big powers may not break out immediately, the process, restricted for the time being to the invasion of neutral countries, is still continuing. Ultimately it will certainly lead all the big powers into an unprecedented cruel war. There can be no doubt as to this future prospect.

¹⁶ The reference is to the partisans of Pierre-Etienne Flandin, a rightist political figure of this period.

"To lift a stone only to drop it on one's own foot"—this is the inevitable consequence of Chamberlain's policy.

5. The Majority of Humanity Throughout the World Is Gradually Being Mobilized

As regards all of the capitalist countries, because of the general economic crisis, capitalism has entered a dead end from which there is no escape. The war involving 600 million people affects the whole world, and new and larger wars are threatening mankind. As regards the socialist country, on the other hand, everything looks bright, progressive, strong, and prosperous. In the contrast between these two opposites, the majority of the human race in this world have gradually found the direction to protect and liberate themselves. They are gradually uniting on an unprecedentedly large scale and in unprecedented depth and are preparing to fight. World War I, the strength and prosperity of the socialist country in the past twenty years, the decline of the capitalist countries, the wars of aggression by the fascist countries in the past six or seven years, China's great War of Resistance against Japan, the people's war in Spain, and even Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and so on, gradually taught Great Britain, France, and other countries, and the people of the whole world a lesson. These events made them understand that organizing and fighting is the only way out, that only by uniting as one all the people in the world who are seeking liberation for themselves, only if there is a united front between the people of the world and the oppressed nations will there be a way out. This great process of awakening the people of the world, organizing them, fighting, and forming a united front is moving forward, but it can succeed only after great and arduous efforts. The war threat of fascism and the appeasement of Chamberlain will, in the end, encounter great resistance. This is undoubtedly also a future prospect; it is an inevitable consequence of the fascist war and Chamberlain's policy as well.

6. Cooperation Between the Chinese Resistance to the War of Aggression and the Worldwide Antifascist Movement

Everyone is aware of what has happened in the past. To some extent, all the democratic countries are assisting China, mainly because of their people's sympathy for China. The assistance from the Soviet Union is especially active. Now, because of the deep penetration by the offensive of the Japanese bandits, the contradictions between Britain, America, France, and the Soviet Union, on one side, and Japan, on the other, have deepened. Although Britain may practice appeasement in the East as it has in the West, in an attempt to preserve more or less its commerce with the Japanese-occupied territory, and under the illusion that Japan will reduce its threat to Southeast Asia, compromise to some extent with Japan, a fundamental compromise will be very difficult, at least for the time being. This is because of the

Japanese policy of unilateral occupation, as a result of which the problem of the East differs to some degree from the problem of the West in terms of the specific current situation. The deep penetration of Japan's offensive has deepened the contradictions between Japan and America, the friendship between the Soviet Union and China is increasing, and there is a possibility of further intimacy between China, America, and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, we must, first, not forget the differences between the capitalist countries and the socialist countries. Second, we must not forget the differences between the government and the people in the capitalist countries. Third, it is even more important not to forget the differences between the present and the future, and we should not expect too much from the former. We should strive to win every possible assistance at present, and, to some extent, this is not only a possibility but a reality. But it is not appropriate to expect too much. The coordination between the Chinese national liberation movement and foreign assistance is mainly coordination in the future with the progressive nations and the people's antifascist movements in the entire world. While taking self-reliance as the principle policy, we should not abandon the effort to win foreign aid. Such should be the basis on which we place ourselves.

VII. The Place of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War

1. The Nature of the Question

Comrades, the prospects ahead of us are bright. China¹⁷ must defeat Japanese imperialism and can defeat it.¹⁸ There is, however, a difficult road ahead between the present and that bright future. We, and the entire nation,¹⁹ who are fighting for a bright China, must fight *the dark forces* of the Japanese bandits step by step and can defeat them only after a long struggle. *What is the role of Communist Party members in this war? In what way should they act so that they may truly be said to have exerted their utmost efforts?*²⁰ We have also summed up the experience gained since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, appraised the present situation, and defined the urgent tasks confronting the whole nation. We have also discussed the theory²¹ of sustaining a long war by means of long-term cooperation,²² as well as the methods for doing so, and we have analyzed the international situation. What

17. China → We

18. And can defeat it → And must build a new China, and we can definitely achieve this goal

19. We, and the entire nation → The Chinese Communist Party and the people of the whole country

20. Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the following sentence: "We have already said a good deal about problems relating to various aspects of this war."

21. Theory → Reasons

22. Cooperation → The Anti-Japanese National United Front

then remains? Comrades, there is one more point,²³ namely, the question of what role the Chinese Communist Party should play in the national war, or how Communists should understand their own role, strengthen themselves, and close their ranks, for only thus can they be considered to have done their utmost in the national war.²⁴

2. Patriotism and Internationalism

Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? He can be, and should be,²⁵ depending on the historical conditions.²⁶ There is the patriotism²⁷ of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our patriotism. With respect to the Japanese aggressors and Hitler,²⁸ Communists resolutely oppose *this so-called patriotism*. The Japanese Communist Party and the German Communist Party are all defeatists with regard to the war²⁹ and use every possible means to bring about the defeat of the wars of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler,³⁰ the more complete the defeat the better. This is what the Japanese and German Communists should be doing, and it is precisely what they are doing. The reason is that the wars launched by the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are harming their own people as well as the people of the world. For us, patriotism and internationalism are closely linked.³¹ Our slogan is: "Fight to defend the motherland against the aggressors." For us defeatism is a crime and *to go all out to assist Chairman Chiang and the National Government*³² is a sacred duty, an inescapable duty. *Here, there cannot be the slightest bit of negativism*. The reason is that only by fighting in defense of the motherland can we save the whole nation from flood and fire.³³ And only by achieving national liberation will there be emancipation for the proletariat

23. Point → Question

24. For only thus can they be considered to have done their utmost in the national war → For only thus can they lead this war to victory and not to defeat

25. He can be, and should be → We hold that he not only can be but should be

26. Depending on the historical conditions → The specific content of patriotism is determined by the historical conditions

27. Patriotism → "Patriotism"

28. Hitler → Hitler's so-called patriotism

29. To the war → To the war waged by their countries

30. Here the revised version inserts: for this is in the interest of the Japanese and German peoples

31. For us, patriotism and internationalism are closely linked → China's case is different, because it is the victim of aggression. Chinese Communists must therefore combine patriotism with internationalism. We are at once internationalists and patriots

32. To go all out to assist Chairman Chiang and the National Government → To strive for victory in the War of Resistance

33. Save the whole nation from flood and fire → Defeat the aggressors and achieve national liberation

and other working people.³⁴ Patriotism is the application of internationalism in national revolutionary wars. For this reason, Communists must use their initiative to the full, march bravely and resolutely to the battlefield of the national revolutionary war, and train *every* gun on the Japanese aggressors. *Not the slightest negativism is permitted. It is imperative that we exert ourselves to the utmost to assist friendly parties and friendly forces. There must be no inclination to sit and observe the course of victory and defeat.* For this reason, immediately after the September Eighteenth Incident, 1931, our Party issued the slogan of³⁵ resisting the Japanese aggressors by a war of national defense, and later proposed *and upheld* an Anti-Japanese National United Front, ordered the Red Army to reorganize as part of the anti-Japanese National Revolutionary Army and to march to the front, and instructed Party members to take their place in the forefront of the war and defend the motherland to the last drop of their blood. *Such actions, such patriotism, are all legitimate; they are appropriate and necessary.* Far from running counter to internationalism, they are precisely its manifestation³⁶ in China. Only those who are politically muddle-headed or have ulterior motives *close their eyes and* talk nonsense about our having made a mistake and abandoned internationalism.

3. Communists Should Set an Example in the National War

For the above reasons, Communists should show a high degree of initiative in the national war and show it concretely, that is, they should play an exemplary vanguard role in every sphere. *This war of ours is being waged under adverse circumstances. The reason for the emergence of such adverse circumstances lies in the fact that up until this moment the extensive dynamic forces of our nation have only just begun to be mobilized.* National consciousness, national self-respect, and national self-confidence are not sufficiently developed among the majority of the popular masses, the majority of the popular masses are unorganized, our military power is weak, the economy is backward, the political system has not been democratized,³⁷ phenomena of corruption and pessimism exist, and a lack of unity and solidarity is to be found within the united front; *all these are the main reasons* for the formation of such adverse circumstances. For these reasons, Communists must consciously shoulder the great responsibility of uniting the entire nation so as to achieve progress.³⁸ Here the exemplary vanguard role of the Communists is

of vital importance. In the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, they should set an example in fighting bravely, carrying out orders, observing discipline, doing political work, and fostering internal unity and solidarity. In their relations with friendly parties and armies, Communists should take a firm stand of unity and solidarity,³⁹ uphold the program of the united front, and set an example in carrying out the tasks of resistance. They should be true in word and resolute in deed, free from arrogance and sincere in consulting and cooperating with the friendly parties and armies, and should be models in interparty relations within the united front. Every Communist engaged in government work should set an example of absolute integrity, of freedom from favoritism in making appointments, and of hard work for little remuneration. Every Communist working among the popular masses should be their friend and not a boss over them, an indefatigable teacher and not a bureaucratic politician. At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place his personal interests first; he should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight, and so on, are most contemptible, while selflessness, working with all one's energy, whole-hearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work, *among other things, are examples which* will command respect. Communists should work in harmony with all progressives outside the Party and endeavor to unite the entire people to do away with whatever is undesirable. It must be realized that Communists form only a small section of the nation and that there are large numbers of progressives and activists outside the Party with whom we must work. It is entirely wrong to think that "we alone are good and no one else is any good." As for people who are [politically] backward, Communists should not slight or despise them, but should *respect them*, befriend them, unite with them, convince them, and encourage them to go forward. The attitude of Communists toward any person who has made mistakes in his work should be one of persuasion in order to help him change and start afresh and not one of exclusion, unless he is incorrigible. Communists should set an example in being practical as well as farsighted, because it is only by being practical that they can fulfill the appointed tasks, and only farsightedness can prevent them from losing their bearings in the march forward. Communists should therefore set an example in study; at all times they should learn from the masses as well as teach them. Only by learning from the people, from actual circumstances, and from the friendly parties and armies, and by knowing them well, can we be practical in our work and farsighted as to the future. In a long war and in adverse circumstances, the dynamic energy of the whole nation can be mobilized in the struggle to *raise the level of the backward*, to overcome difficulties, defeat the enemy, and build a new China only if the Communists play an exemplary vanguard role to the best of their ability together with all the advanced elements among the friendly parties and armies and among the masses.

34. Will there be emancipation for the proletariat and other working people → Will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the overthrow of the invading imperialists will, at the same time, aid the people of foreign countries

35. Slogan of → Call for

36. Manifestation → Realization

37. Has not been democratized → Is undemocratic

38. Achieve progress → Put an end to all such undesirable phenomena

39. Solidarity → Resistance to Japan

4. *Unite the Whole Nation and Combat Enemy Agents in the National Front*⁴⁰

The one and only policy orientation in order to carry out the central task of overcoming difficulties and defeating the enemy⁴¹ is to unite the whole nation, consolidate and expand the united front,⁴² and mobilize the vital forces of *the various strata* of the whole nation. However, there are enemy agents already playing a disruptive role *or who seek to sneak in and do so* within our national united front, namely, the Chinese traitors, Trotskyites, and pro-Japanese elements *who are hidden, but publicly appear to resist Japan*. Communists must always be on the lookout for such agents, expose their criminal activities on the basis of factual evidence, *in view of the concrete circumstances*, and *at the same time* warn the *friendly parties and armies and the broad masses of the people* not to be duped by them. Communists have an important responsibility to sharpen⁴³ their political vigilance toward these national [i.e., Chinese] agents. The expansion and consolidation of the national united front is inseparable from the exposure and weeding out of enemy agents.⁴⁴

5. *Expand the Communist Party and Prevent Infiltration by Enemy Agents*

To overcome the difficulties, and defeat the enemy,⁴⁵ the Communist Party must expand its organization and become a great mass party by opening its doors to the masses of workers, peasants, and young activists who are truly devoted to the revolution, who believe in the Party's ideology, support its policies, and are willing to observe its discipline and work hard. Here no tendency toward closed-doorism should be tolerated. But, at the same time, there must definitely be no slackening of vigilance against infiltration by enemy agents. The Japanese imperialist secret services are ceaselessly trying to disrupt our Party and to smuggle undercover traitors, Trotskyites, pro-Japanese elements, degenerates, and careerists into its ranks in the guise of activists. Not for a moment should we relax our vigilance and our strict precautions against such elements. We must not close the doors to our Party for fear of enemy agents, our set policy being boldly to expand our Party. But, at the same time, while thus boldly expanding, we must not relax our vigilance against enemy agents and careerists who will avail themselves of this oppor-

40. National front → Nation

41. Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "and building a new China"

42. United front → Anti-Japanese National United Front

43. Have an important responsibility to sharpen → Must understand the importance of sharpening

44. Here the *Selected Works* version adds the following sentence: It is entirely wrong to pay attention only to one aspect and forget the other.

45. Defeat the enemy → Defeat the enemy, and build a new China

tunity to sneak in.⁴⁶ Our general policy in developing the Party⁴⁷ is: "Expand the Party boldly but do not let a single undesirable make his way in."

6. *Maintain Both the United Front and the Independence of the Party*

If there were only one class, one party in China, then there would no longer be the need for the so-called united front. The so-called united front is predicated on the existence of more than two classes and parties. It is only by firmly maintaining the Anti-Japanese National United Front that we can defeat the enemy.⁴⁸ *Moreover, this policy must be adhered to over a long period.* This is our firmly established orientation.⁴⁹ But, at the same time, every party and group in the united front must preserve its ideological, political, and organizational independence; this holds good for the Guomindang, the Communist Party, or any other party or group. *What is the Principle of People's Rights in the Three People's Principles?* In interparty relations, it permits both alliance and unity of the various parties and factions, and their independent coexistence.⁵⁰ To speak of unity alone while denying independence is *an idea* which abandons the Principle of Democracy, and to this neither the Communist Party nor any other party would agree. There is no doubt that *within the united front independence cannot exceed union but has to give way to union*, and that independence within the united front is *only and can only be a relative thing*. Otherwise, *it cannot count as maintaining a united front*. It would undermine the general policy of unity against the enemy. But, *at the same time*, this relative independence must not be denied; ideologically, politically, and organizationally, each party must have its relative freedom.⁵¹ Also, unity against the enemy⁵² and the united front would be undermined if this relative *independence or freedom* were denied or voluntarily abandoned. This should be clearly understood by all members of the Communist Party as well as of the friendly parties.

The same is true of the relationship between the class struggle and the national struggle. It is an established principle that in the War of Resistance everything must be subordinated to the interests of resistance, and that class struggle must be subordinated to the interests *and requirements* of the national struggle but absolutely

46. Here the *Selected Works* text adds: If we pay attention only to one aspect, and forget the other aspect, we will commit errors.

47. Our general policy in developing the Party → The only correct policy

48. That we can defeat the enemy → That we can overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy, and build a new China

49. This is our firmly established orientation → This is beyond all doubt

50. Both alliance and unity of the various parties and factions, and their independent coexistence → Both the mutual union of the various parties and factions, and their independent existence

51. Each party must have its relative freedom → Each party must have its relative independence, that is, relative freedom

52. Unity against the enemy → The overall policy orientation of unity against the enemy

should not run counter to them. But, *at the same time*, under conditions of the existence of class society, you cannot eliminate class struggle; there is no way to eliminate it.⁵³ The theory which seeks to deny *fundamentally* the existence of class struggle is a distorted theory.⁵⁴ We do not deny the class struggle; we adjust it. The policy of mutual help and mutual concessions which we advocate is applicable not only to relations between parties and factions but *basically* also to class relations. In order to unite against Japan, we must carry out an appropriate policy of adjustment in class relations, a policy which does not leave the toiling masses without political and material safeguards, but also gives consideration to the interests of the rich, thereby meeting the *general* demand of solidarity against the enemy.⁵⁵

7. Consider the Situation as a Whole, Think in Terms of the Majority, and Work Together with Our Allies

In leading the masses, *participating in the united front*, and waging a struggle against the enemy, Communists must *not ignore the spirit of* considering the situation as a whole, thinking in terms of the majority, and working together with their allies. They should grasp the necessity⁵⁶ of subordinating the needs of the part to the needs of the whole. If a proposal appears feasible for a partial situation but not for the situation as a whole, then the part must give way to the whole. Conversely, if the proposal is not feasible for the part but is feasible in the light of the situation as a whole, again the part must give way to the whole. This is what is meant by considering the situation as a whole. Communists must never detach themselves from the majority of the masses or neglect them by leading only a few progressive contingents in an isolated and rash advance. *This cannot succeed.* Instead, they must *at all times* forge close links between the progressive elements and the broad masses. This is what is meant by thinking in terms of the majority. Wherever there are allies,⁵⁷ in handling matters, they should cooperate with the allies.⁵⁸ It is wrong to indulge in arbitrary decisions and peremptory actions and to ignore our allies. *All these are things that cannot be ignored in the art of leadership and the spirit of work of the Communist Party member.* A good Communist should⁵⁹ be good at considering the situation as a whole, good at thinking in terms of the majority, and

53. You cannot eliminate class struggle; there is no way to eliminate it → The existence of the struggle of one class against another is a fact; there are some people who deny this fact, deny the existence of class struggle, but this is erroneous

54. Is a distorted theory → Is utterly wrong

55. Here the *Selected Works* text adds the following sentence: It is bad for the War of Resistance to pay attention only to one side and neglect the other.

56. Necessity → Principle

57. Allies → Democratic parties or individuals willing to cooperate with us

58. In handling matters, they should cooperate with the allies → The proper attitude for Communists is to talk things over with them and work together with them

59. Should → Must

good at working with his allies. He who violates these points is not a good Party member.⁶⁰

8. Cadre Policy

The Chinese Communist Party is a party leading a great revolutionary struggle in a nation several hundred million strong, and it cannot fulfill its historic task without a large number of leading cadres who combine ability with political integrity. In the last seventeen years our Party has trained a good many talented leaders, so that we have core cadres in military, political, cultural, Party, and mass work; all honor is due to the Party and to the nation for this achievement. But, *at the same time*, the present core is not yet strong enough to support the vast edifice of our struggle, and it is still necessary to train people of ability on a large scale. Many talented people and leaders⁶¹ have come forward, and are continuing to come forward, in the great *national revolutionary* struggle. We have the responsibility for organizing and training them, for taking good care of them, and for making proper use of them. "Once the political line has been laid down, cadres are the decisive factor."⁶² *We should not forget this truth. Here, it is imperative to rely on the original cadre basis, but not to be complacent about it.* Therefore, it should be our fighting task to train large numbers of new cadres in a *persistent and planned* way.

Our concern should extend to non-Party cadres as well as to Party cadres. There are many capable people outside the Party whom we must not ignore. The duty of every Communist is to rid himself of aloofness and arrogance and to work well with non-Party cadres, sincerely unite with them,⁶³ *while offering them well-intentioned assistance*, have a warm, comradely attitude toward them, and enlist their initiative and talents in the great cause of resisting Japan and reconstructing the nation. *It is wrong to be conceited and to look down upon other people.*

We must be good at judging cadres. *In judging the strengths and weaknesses and the good and bad qualities of a cadre, we must not just observe his performance but also his essence.* We must not confine our judgment to a short period or a single incident in a cadre's life, but should consider his life and work as a whole. This is the correct⁶⁴ method of judging cadres. *Here, carelessness or willfulness cannot resolve the problem.*

We must be good at using cadres. In the final analysis, the leaders' responsibilities *and work* consist of two things: to supply ideas, and to use cadres well. Such things as drawing up plans, making decisions, giving orders and directives, *drafting*

60. He who violates these points is not a good Party member → We have had serious shortcomings in this respect, and we must still make an effort to do better

61. Talented people and leaders → Activists

62. The formula is Stalin's.

63. Sincerely unite with them → Give them sincere help

64. Correct → Principal

announcements, writing books, and making speeches are all in the category of "supplying ideas." To put the ideas into practice, we must unite the cadres and push them to go into action; this comes into the category of "using the cadres." *These two things are known in Chinese custom as "employing people in the administration."* Throughout our national history there have been two sharply contrasting lines on the subject of the use of cadres, *reflecting the opposition between the depraved and the upright*, one being to "appoint people on their merit," and the other to "appoint people by favoritism." The former was the policy of sagacious emperors and worthy ministers in making appointments; the latter was that of despots and traitors.⁶⁵ *Today, when we talk about the question of making use of cadres, it is from a revolutionary standpoint, fundamentally different from that of ancient times, and yet there is no getting away from this standard of "appointing people on their merit."* It was utterly wrong in the past, and is still utterly wrong today, to be guided by personal likes and dislikes, to reward fawning flatterers and to punish the honest and forthright. The criterion Lenin and Stalin⁶⁶ apply in cadres policy is whether or not a cadre is resolute in carrying out the Party line, submits to Party discipline, has close ties with the masses, has the ability to work independently, and is active, hard-working, not concerned with personal gain, and so on. This, and nothing else.⁶⁷ Here, the cadres policy of Zhang Guotao was the exact opposite. In Zhang Guotao's domain, he adopted precisely the policy of rewarding those who curried favor with him and penalizing those who were upright.⁶⁸ He gathered a personal clique around himself and harbored ulterior motives. *His petty factional activities had a long and deep history. But it is this cadres policy of his which treats the individual instead of the political principles of the party as the center which turned to its opposite in achieving its goals. All the cadres left him. In the end Zhang Guotao was the only one who remained. He betrayed the Party⁶⁹ and decamped.⁷⁰* This is an important lesson for us. *The political and economic backwardness of a semicolonial, semifeudal society, as reflected within the Party, are the sources of the evil tendencies of liberalism, self-aggrandizement, and factional activity. Taking into consideration the existence of such sources, upholding the organizational line and cadres policy of Lenin and Stalin, opposing the dishonest and unfair evil tendencies, and consolidat-*

65. The former was the policy of sagacious emperors and worthy ministers in making appointments; the latter was that of despots and traitors → The former is the honest and the latter the dishonest way

66. Lenin and Stalin → The Communist Party

67. This, and nothing else → This is what "appointing people on their merit" means

68. In Zhang Guotao's domain, he adopted precisely the policy of rewarding those who curried favor with him and penalizing those who were upright → He carried out the line of "appointing people by favoritism"

69. He betrayed the Party → He formed a small clique and, in the end, betrayed the Party

70. Regarding Zhang Guotao, see Volume V, *passim*, and section IV of the Introduction to this volume. As indicated there, he fled to Hankou in April 1938 and placed himself under the protection of the Guomindang.

ing the unity of the Party on the basis of the *correct line*—these are the responsibilities of the Central Committee as well as comrades of the whole Party.⁷¹

We must know how to take good care of cadres. *The cadres who have emerged through the fostering of the Party and hard struggle are the treasure of the nation and the pride of the whole Party and should be respected and taken care of by comrades of the whole Party. The various levels of leading organs on the other hand have the responsibility to realize the goal of taking care of them by concrete methods. What are such methods?*⁷²

First, give them guidance. This means allowing them a free hand in their work so that they have the courage to assume responsibility and are not afraid of making mistakes, but, at the same time, giving them timely and appropriate instructions concerning the work environment, orientation, and methods so that, guided by the Party's political line, they are able to make full use of their initiative.

Second, raise their level. This means giving them the opportunity to study *theory and methods*, and educating them so that they can enhance their ideological⁷³ understanding and their leadership⁷⁴ ability compared with the past.

Third, check up on their work, *not doing it every day, but doing it at the right moment*, and help them sum up their experience, correct their mistakes, and expand on their achievements. *This is necessary.* To assign work without checking up and to take notice only when serious mistakes are made—that is not the way to take good care of cadres.

Fourth, *transform them.* This means with regard to those cadres who have shortcomings, have made mistakes, or have incorrect ideas, use primarily the method of persuasion, and the method of struggle when there is no alternative, so as to help them change their ways.⁷⁵ Here patience is essential. *In cases of mistakes which do not involve major principles, but must be pointed out or they will not be overcome*, it is wrong to adopt the methods of inappropriately and lightly applying to people labels such as "opportunists," "petty-bourgeois consciousness," and so on, or to begin "waging struggles" against them.

71. Opposing the dishonest and unfair *evil* tendencies, and consolidating the unity of the Party on the basis of the *correct line*—these are the responsibilities of the Central Committee as well as comrades of the whole Party. → Taking warning from this and from similar historical lessons, the Central Committee and the leaders at all levels must make it their major responsibility to adhere to the honest and fair way in cadres policy and reject the dishonest and unfair way, and so consolidate the unity of the Party.

72. What are such methods? → There are several ways of doing so.

73. Ideological → Theoretical

74. Leadership → Working

75. Use primarily the method of persuasion, and the method of struggle when there is no alternative, so as to help them change their ways. → In general, use the method of persuasion with cadres who have made mistakes, and help them correct their mistakes. The method of struggle should be confined to those who make serious mistakes and nevertheless refuse to accept guidance.

Fifth, help them with their difficulties. When cadres are in difficulty as a result of problems such as illness, straitened circumstances, or domestic or other troubles,⁷⁶ *the leading organs of the Party should show warm and kind comradely concern toward them. It is wrong to adopt an apathetic and cold attitude. In cases of illness, they must be given treatment and nursed back to health. As for their circumstances, try to make them compatible with the requirements of work. Even in the case of domestic troubles, to the extent possible efforts should be made to help them seek a resolution. To give priority to the cadres in all these areas to the extent permitted by material resources and the environment has great significance for realizing the goal of enhancing the work spirit of the cadres and achieving the unity of the whole Party.*

9. Party Discipline

The Party's experience of struggle during the past seventeen years, particularly since the Fifth Plenum, demonstrates the necessity of continuing to uphold iron discipline within the Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. Discipline is the guarantee that the line will be carried out. Without discipline, the Party will be unable to lead the masses and the army in victorious struggle. In the past, as a result of overcoming tendencies disruptive of discipline such as that of Zhang Guotao, the smooth pursuit of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the War of Resistance were assured. In the future, this order must also be firmly upheld. Only thus will it be possible to unite the whole Party, overcome new difficulties, and obtain new victories. Here, it is intolerable to ignore several fundamental principles.⁷⁷

1. the individual is subordinate to the organization;
2. the minority is subordinate to the majority;
3. the lower level is subordinate to the higher level;
4. the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee.

These principles constitute the concrete application of the Party's system of democratic centralism. Whoever violates them violates the Party's democratic centralism and does great damage to Party unity and the Party's revolutionary struggle. Because of this, the various leading organs at the different levels of the Party should provide the necessary education on discipline to the whole Party and particularly to new Party members in accordance with the above basic principles. Past experience proves that some people violate Party discipline through not know-

76. Here the *Selected Works* text adds the following two sentences: We must be sure to give them as much care as possible. This is how to take good care of cadres.

77. In the *Selected Works* version of this text, the preceding paragraph set in italics is replaced by a single sentence: In view of Zhang Guotao's serious violations of discipline, we must affirm anew the discipline of the Party.

ing what it is. Some others, like Zhang Guotao *and his ilk*, violate it knowingly, and take advantage of some⁷⁸ Party members' ignorance to achieve their treacherous purposes. Hence it is necessary to educate members in Party discipline so that the rank-and-file Party members will not only get into the habit of observing discipline themselves but also exercise supervision over the leaders so that they, too, observe it.⁷⁹ *Party discipline is compulsory in nature. But at the same time, it must be formulated on the basis of the political awareness of Party members and cadres. It is by no means one-sided commandism.* For this reason, leading organs, from the Central Committee level to the local level, should draft certain Party rules which will be treated as part of the Party's law and discipline.⁸⁰ *Once they are formulated, they must be strictly applied, so as to unify the actions of the leading bodies at all levels and to become examples for the whole Party.*

10. Party Democracy

Finding itself confronted as it is by the present great struggle, the Chinese Communist Party demands that all its leading bodies and all its members and cadres should give the fullest expression to their initiative, which alone can lead the struggle to victory. What we call giving expression to their initiative *cannot be just an empty phrase*, but must be demonstrated concretely in the creative capacity of the leading bodies, the cadres, and the Party rank and file, in their readiness to assume responsibility, in the exuberant vigor they show in their work, in their courage and ability to raise questions, voice opinions, and criticize defects, and in the comradely supervision that is maintained over the leading bodies and the leading cadres *and so on and so forth*. Otherwise, the so-called initiative will be an empty thing. But the exercise of such initiative depends on the democratization of the inner-Party life *and system*. *If such democratic life is absent or deficient*, it is impossible to reach the goal of bringing initiative into play. Only in an atmosphere of democracy can large numbers of able people be brought forward.

Because our country down to the present still does not have democratic life, and this is reflected within the Party, there has arisen the phenomenon of inadequate democratic life.⁸¹ This phenomenon *truly* hinders the entire Party from

78. Some → Many

79. Here the *Selected Works* version adds: thus preventing the recurrence of cases like Zhang Guotao's.

80. For this reason, leading organs, from the Central Committee level to the local level, should draft certain Party rules which will be treated as part of the Party's law and discipline. → If we are to ensure the development of inner-Party relations along the right lines, besides the four most important articles of discipline mentioned above, we must work out a set of fairly detailed inner-Party rules.

81. Because our country down to the present still does not have democratic life, and this is reflected within the Party, there has arisen the phenomenon of inadequate democratic life. → Ours is a country in which small-scale production and the patriarchal system prevail, and taking the country as a whole, there is as yet no democratic life; consequently, this state of affairs is reflected in our Party by insufficient democracy in Party life.

exercising its initiative to the full. Similarly, it has led to insufficient democratization⁸² in the united front and in the mass movements. For these reasons, education in democracy must be carried on within the Party so that members can understand what is meant by democratic life, what is meant by the relationship between democracy and centralism, and the way in which democratic centralism should be put into practice. Only in this way can we really extend democracy within the Party, and at the same time avoid ultrademocracy and laissez-faire.⁸³

It is also essential to extend democracy in our Party organizations in the army to the degree necessary to stimulate the initiative of the Party members and increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. *At the same time*, however, there should be somewhat less democracy in the Party organizations in the army than in the local Party organizations; it is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them.⁸⁴ *The local Party, too, should also benefit from the consolidation of Party discipline and the enhancement of the Party's combat effectiveness, and not the reverse.*

The extension of inner-Party democracy should be seen as an essential step in the consolidation and development of the Party, and as a *useful and* important weapon enabling it to be lively and dynamic in the great struggle, to be more than equal to its tasks, to develop new strength, and to surmount the difficulties of the war.

11. Our Party Has Consolidated Itself and Grown in Strength Through the Struggle on Two Fronts

Broadly speaking, in the last seventeen years our Party has learned to use *this* Marxist weapon⁸⁵—*the method of struggle on two fronts in ideology, in politics, and in work*, opposing Right opportunism, on the one hand, and opposing Left opportunism, on the other.

Before the Fifth Plenum,⁸⁶ our Party fought Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism and Li Lisan's Left opportunism.⁸⁷ It made great progress thanks to the victories in these two inner-Party struggles. After the Fifth Plenum, there were two further historic inner-Party struggles, namely, at the Zunyi Conference and in connection with the expulsion of Zhang Guotao.⁸⁸

82. Democratization → Democratic life

83. Laissez-faire → Laissez-faire, which destroys discipline

84. It is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them. → Both in the army and in the local organizations, inner-Party democracy is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them.

85. Marxist weapon → Marxist-Leninist weapon of ideological struggle

86. Fifth Plenum → Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee

87. Li Lisan's Left opportunism → Comrade Li Lisan's "Left" opportunism. Regarding the rivalry and conflict between Mao and Li in 1930, see the Introduction to Volume III, *passim*.

88. Regarding the Zunyi Conference, see the Introduction to Volume V, pp. xxxvii–xxxix.

Because the Zunyi Conference corrected serious errors of a Left-opportunist character—errors of principle committed in the fight against the enemy's Fifth Encirclement and Suppression campaign—and united the Party and the Red Army, it enabled the Central Committee and the main forces of the Red Army to bring the Long March to a triumphant conclusion, to advance to a forward position in the resistance to Japan, and to carry out the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. By combating Zhang Guotao's Right opportunism, the Baxi and Yan'an Meetings⁸⁹ (the fight against the Zhang Guotao line began at the Baxi Meeting and ended at the Yan'an Meeting) succeeded in bringing all the Red forces together and in strengthening the unity of the whole Party for the heroic struggle against Japan. Both kinds of opportunist mistakes arose during the civil war,⁹⁰ and their characteristic was that they were errors committed during the war.

What are the lessons which have been derived from these two inner-Party struggles? They are:

1. The tendency to Left impetuosity, which disregards both the subjective and the objective factors, is extremely harmful to a revolutionary war and, for that matter, to any revolutionary movement—it was among the serious errors of principle which were manifested in the struggle against the enemy's Fifth Encirclement and Suppression campaign, and which arose from ignorance of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war. *It should be pointed out that the errors made then were not errors in the general line, but errors of principle of a serious nature, involving the carrying out of the general line in the tactics and pattern of the war.*

2. The opportunism of Zhang Guotao, however, was Right opportunism in the revolutionary war and was a combination of a retreatist line, warlordism, and anti-Party activity. It was only with the overcoming of this brand of opportunism that the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army and *especially* its large numbers of cadres and Party members, men of intrinsically fine quality and with a long record of heroic struggle, were able to free themselves from its toils and return to the correct line of the Central Committee.

3. Striking results were achieved in the great organizational work of the period of the Central Soviet Area⁹¹—in army building, government work, mass work, and Party building. Had it not been for the support rendered by such organizational work to the heroic fighting at the front, we could not have kept up the bitter

89. Regarding Mao's negotiations with Zhang Guotao during a halt in Baxi in early September 1936, at a difficult moment in the Long March, see the Introduction to Volume V, pp. xlv–xlvii. (Zhang and his armies remained farther south, and there was no face-to-face contact on this occasion.) After Zhang came to Yan'an and met with Mao in 1937, he became vice-chairman of the Border Region government but had no real power. As noted above, he sought refuge with the Guomindang in the spring of 1938.

90. During the civil war → During the revolutionary civil war

91. Organizational work of the period of the Central Soviet Area → Organizational work of the ten years of the Agrarian Revolutionary War

struggle.⁹² At that time,⁹³ however, serious errors of principle were made in the Party's cadre policy and organizational principles, errors which showed themselves in the tendency toward sectarianism, in punishmentism, and in excesses in the policy of ideological struggle. They resulted both from our failure to eliminate the vestiges of the former *Li Lisan* line and from the political mistakes in matters of principle committed at the time. These errors, too, were corrected at the Zunyi Meeting, and the Party was thus able to make the turn to a *wholly* correct cadre policy and organizational principles. As for Zhang Guotao's organizational line, it violated all Party principles, disrupted Party discipline, and carried factional activity to the point of opposition to the Party, the Central Committee, and the Communist International. The Central Committee did everything possible to overcome Zhang Guotao's evil line and to frustrate his anti-Party activity, and also tried to save Zhang Guotao himself. But as he stubbornly refused to change,⁹⁴ resorted to double-dealing, and subsequently even betrayed the Party,⁹⁵ firm measures had to be taken to expel him. This expulsion⁹⁶ won the support not only of all Party members but of all people loyal to the cause of national liberation. The Communist International has already endorsed⁹⁷ the decision and denounced Zhang Guotao as a deserter and renegade.

These lessons and achievements have furnished us with the prerequisites for uniting the whole Party now and in the future, for strengthening its ideological, political, and organizational unity, and for successfully waging the War of Resistance and *constructing the Anti-Japanese National United Front*. Our Party has consolidated itself and grown strong through the struggle on two fronts.

12. The Present Struggle on Two Fronts

From now on, it is of paramount importance to wage a political struggle against Rightist pessimism in the *new* circumstances of the War of Resistance, although it is still necessary to keep an eye on "Left" impetuosity. On questions of the united front and of Party and mass organization, we must continue the fight against the "Left" tendency toward closed-doorism if we are to achieve long-term cooperation,⁹⁸ expand the Party, and broaden the movement of the popular masses. At the same time, we must also pay attention to⁹⁹ the Right opportunist tendency toward

92. Bitter struggle → Bitter struggle against Chiang Kaishek

93. At that time → In the latter part of that period

94. To change → To correct his mistakes

95. Even betrayed the Party → Even betrayed the Party and threw himself into the arms of the Guomindang

96. Expulsion → Disciplinary action

97. Already endorsed → Also endorsed

98. If we are to achieve long-term cooperation → If we are to achieve cooperation with the various other anti-Japanese parties and groups

99. Pay attention to → Take care to combat

unconditional cooperation and expansion, or otherwise they will hinder cooperation and development, or turn them into capitulationist cooperation and unprincipled expansion.

Struggle on two fronts¹⁰⁰ must suit the concrete circumstances of *the reality* of each case, and we must never approach a problem abstractly.¹⁰¹ *There is a difference between pointing things out in a general way and concrete application.* The bad old habit of "putting hats" on people, that is, the abstract application of this method, is no good.¹⁰²

In the struggle against deviations, we must give serious attention to opposing two-faced behavior. As Zhang Guotao's career shows, the greatest danger of such behavior is that it may develop into factional activity. To comply in public but oppose in private, to say yes and mean no, to say nice things to a person's face but play tricks behind his back—these are the essence of¹⁰³ double-dealing. Sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior is an important requirement for strengthening Party discipline.¹⁰⁴

13. Study

Generally speaking, all Communist Party members who have a certain capacity for study should study the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, study the history of our nation, and study the circumstances and trends of current movements; moreover, they should serve to educate members with a lower cultural level. The cadres in particular should study these subjects carefully, while the Central Committee and senior cadres should give them even more attention. It is not possible to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless there is revolutionary theory, a knowledge of history, and an understanding of the practical movement.¹⁰⁵

The theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are universally applicable. We should not regard their theories as dogma but as a guide to action. We do not study

100. Struggle on two fronts → Ideological struggle on two fronts

101. Abstractly → Subjectively

102. The bad old habit of "putting hats" on people, that is, the abstract application of this method, is no good. → We must absolutely not approach a problem subjectively or permit the bad old habit of "putting hats" on people to continue.

103. The essence of → All forms of

104. Sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior is an important requirement for strengthening Party discipline. → Only by sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior can we strengthen Party discipline.

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the letter of Marxism-Leninism but, rather, the standpoints and methods by which Marx and Lenin observed and resolved problems.¹⁰⁶ *Only this guide to action, these standpoints and methods, constitute revolutionary science and the only correct policy which leads us to recognize the objects of the revolution and guide revolutionary movements.* The Chinese Party's¹⁰⁷ mastery of Marxism¹⁰⁸ is now much better¹⁰⁹ than it used to be, but can still not be called extensive or deep. *In this regard, we appear inadequate compared to some fraternal parties abroad. Yet ours is the task of leading a great nation of 450 million in an unprecedented and historic struggle. For us, therefore, the task of spreading and deepening the study of theory¹¹⁰ presents a big problem demanding an early solution, which can be resolved only through concentrated effort. Let us exert ourselves. Following¹¹¹ this Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, there will be an all-Party emulation in study which will show who has really learned something, and who has learned more and learned better. Our work has not been done too badly. But if we do not deepen our study of theory, we will not be able to do an even better job, and only if we do an even better job will we be victorious. Therefore the study of theory is the condition for victory.* As regards those who shoulder the main responsibilities of leadership, if in China there are one or two hundred comrades with a grasp of Marxism which is systematic and not fragmentary, genuine and not hollow, that will be tantamount to defeating Japanese imperialism.¹¹² Comrades, we must definitely study Marxism.

Another of our tasks is to study our historical heritage and use the Marxist method to sum it up critically. The history of this *great* nation of ours goes back several thousand years. *It has its own laws of development, its own national characteristics, and many precious treasures.* As regards all this, we are mere schoolboys. Today's China is an outgrowth of historic China. We are Marxist historicists; we must not mutilate history. From Confucius to Sun Yatsen, we must sum it up critically, and we must constitute ourselves the heirs to this precious legacy. *Conversely, the assimilation of this legacy itself becomes a method that aids considerably in guiding the present great movement.* A Communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marx-

106. We do not study the letter of Marxism-Leninism but, rather, the standpoints and methods by which Marx and Lenin observed and resolved problems. → Studying it is not merely a matter of learning terms and phrases but of learning Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution. It is not just a matter of understanding the general laws derived by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin from their extensive study of real life and revolutionary experience, but of studying their standpoint and method in examining and solving problems.

107. The Chinese Party's → Our Party's

108. Marxism → Marxism-Leninism

109. Much better → Somewhat better

110. Theory → Marxist-Leninist theory

111. Let us exert ourselves. Following → I hope that following

112. That will be tantamount to defeating Japanese imperialism → Our Party's fighting capacity will be much greater and our task of defeating Japanese imperialism will be more quickly accomplished

ism must take on a national form before it can be put into practice.¹¹³ *There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used.* If a Chinese Communist, who is a part of the great Chinese people, bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty abstraction. Consequently, the *sinification of Marxism*¹¹⁴—that is to say, making certain that in all its manifestations it is imbued with Chinese characteristics, using it according to Chinese peculiarities—becomes a problem that must be understood and solved by the whole Party without delay. We must put an end to foreign formalism. There must be less repeating of empty and abstract refrains; we must discard our dogmatism and replace it with a new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people. To separate internationalist content from national form is the way of those who understand nothing of internationalism, and we must link the two inseparably. As regards this question, serious shortcomings still persist in our ranks and must be resolutely eliminated.

What are the characteristics of the present movement? What are its laws? How is it to be directed? These are all *the most* practical questions. To this day we do not yet understand everything about Japanese imperialism or about China. The movement is developing, new things have yet to emerge, and they are emerging in an endless stream. To study this movement in its entirety and in its development is a great task to which we should pay constant attention *with our eyes wide open.* Whoever refuses to study these problems seriously and carefully is *nothing but a Spanish Don Quixote plus a Chinese Ah Q*,¹¹⁵ but no Marxist. *How shall we study? We should use the Marxist tool—dialectical materialism. With whom do we study? We have many teachers—the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the capitalists, the landlords, Japanese imperialism, and the whole world. They are all the objects of our study and, at the same time, our teachers. We should learn something, more or less, from them.*

Complacency is the enemy of study. We cannot really learn anything until we rid ourselves of complacency. Our attitude toward ourselves should be “to learn without satiety,” and toward others “to instruct without being wearied.”¹¹⁶

113. Marxism must take on a national form before it can be put into practice → We can put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and acquires a definite national form. The great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its integration with the concrete revolutionary practice of all countries. For the Chinese Communist Party, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of China.

114. The sinification of Marxism → Applying Marxism concretely in China

115. Ah Q was the central character in the most celebrated of Lu Xun's short stories. In a series of episodes, he is repeatedly worsted but persuades himself that he was the victor because of his moral superiority.

116. The quotations are from the *Analects* of Confucius, VII, II (Legge, Vol. I, p. 195).

14. From Uniting the Whole Party to Uniting the Whole Nation

Great struggle requires great strength. It is our established policy orientation to unite the whole nation and to mobilize all the dynamic forces of the whole nation to join this struggle. In order to reach this goal, unity within the Chinese Communist Party plays a major role and is the most fundamental prerequisite.¹¹⁷ After the Zunyi Meeting and the correction of Zhang Guotao's mistakes, our Party has now entered the period of greatest unity since the meeting of its Sixth National Congress. Now, within our Party, there is identity of views, both within the Central Committee and in the whole Party, whether it be regarding the political line, strategic policy, the estimate of the current situation, or the formulation of our tasks. This identity of views on political principles is the basic condition for unity. With regard to the mutual relations between Party members, cadres, and leaders, which are customarily called personnel matters, we have also learned many correct and appropriate methods. We have created an atmosphere of working together with one accord under correct political principles and established better mutual relations. Because of the vastness of the territory, the complexity of the circumstances, and the differences among the departments, it is difficult to avoid having differing views, and there should be differing views. The true practice of inner-Party democracy permits the putting forth and discussion of all sorts of different viewpoints. It is also precisely the democratic method which assures an exchange of views and leads to the summarizing of these views to form a conclusion, thereby bringing about a unified policy orientation of the whole Party. Here, we have also gradually learned the Marxist method of looking at questions in an objective and many-sided way, but not with subjectivity, prejudice, willfulness, or partiality. This also assures the unity of the Party. We are scientific Marxists. The style of conceit and willfulness is a useless thing. Seventeen years of tempering have enabled the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders to acquire a thoroughly seasoned style.¹¹⁸ All these things can assure the unity of the Central Committee and of the whole Party. Thus we are able to form a unified¹¹⁹ nucleus and center of gravity for the whole nation¹²⁰ to push the Resistance War to victory.¹²¹ Comrades, let the whole Party unite! Let the whole nation unite! Victory will certainly be ours!¹²²

117. Is the most fundamental prerequisite → Is the most fundamental prerequisite for uniting the whole nation to win the War of Resistance and build a new China

118. Seventeen years of tempering have enabled the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders to acquire a thoroughly seasoned style. → Seventeen years of tempering have taught the Chinese Communist Party many ways of attaining internal unity, and ours is now a much more seasoned Party.

119. Unified → Powerful

120. For the whole nation → For the people of the whole country

121. To push the Resistance War to victory → In the struggle to win victory in the War of Resistance and to build a new China

122. Let the whole Party unite! Let the whole nation unite! Victory will certainly be ours! → So long as we are united, we can certainly reach this goal.

VIII. Summoning the Seventh National Congress of the Party

Now I will talk about the last issue, the question of summoning the Seventh National Congress.

Comrades, for reasons determined by the circumstances, it is already ten years since the Sixth National Congress of our Party in 1928. The Politburo meeting last December decided to prepare for the Seventh Congress, but the preparatory work has not yet been completed, and consequently it will be difficult to hold it this year. The present enlarged plenum should discuss the question of speeding up this preparatory work and decide to summon the congress in the not-too-distant future. The political significance of this congress will be great. It will summarize the experience of the past, especially the experience of the War of Resistance throughout the country, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It will discuss the domestic and international political situations. It will discuss how to take another step forward in uniting the entire nation, uniting the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as all the other parties, and further enhancing and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It will discuss the policies, methods, and plans for winning final victory in the War of Resistance, in the context of a protracted war and long-term cooperation. It will discuss how to mobilize the working class and the toiling people throughout the country to take part more actively in the War of Resistance. Furthermore, we should discuss how the Party, in the new circumstances, will further unite and strengthen itself, and consolidate its links with the Guomindang, the other parties, and the people of the whole country, in order to carry out smoothly the general orientation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Apart from these political and organizational problems, the Seventh Congress should elect the new Central Committee, elect numerous leading comrades enjoying the highest prestige in the entire Party to the Central Committee, and strengthen the leadership over the work of the whole Party. Comrades, the significance of this congress is so great that when this Enlarged Sixth Plenum is over and you go back to your places of work, you must, on the basis of efforts at greatly enlarging and strengthening the Party, according to democratic methods, choose the proper time to carry out the elections, so that the best cadres and Party members and those most trusted by the Party members and the masses, will have the opportunity to be elected as delegates to this congress. As a result, the Seventh Congress will be able to gather together the best representatives of the Party in one hall, thereby guaranteeing the success of this congress. We are confident that this national congress will definitely be able to succeed, and to inflict on the war of aggression of Japanese imperialism the most solemn and serious, most forceful answer. Let Japanese imperialism tremble before our national congress, let it tumble into the Eastern Sea. The Chinese nation will definitely be victorious.

That is all for my report.